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1Executive summary
Introduction
Europe has begun to emerge from the prolonged slump that began with the global financial crisis 
in 2008 and was deepened by the euro zone single-currency crisis in 2010–2011. In the last 
year, aggregate employment levels have risen faster than at any time since 2008. Aggregate EU 
unemployment rates have been declining since September 2013.
This, the fourth annual European Jobs Monitor report, looks in more detail at shifts in employment 
at Member State and aggregate EU level between the second quarter (Q2) of 2011 and 2014 Q2. 
A ‘jobs-based’ approach is applied in order to describe employment shifts quantitatively (how many 
jobs were created or destroyed) and qualitatively (what kinds of jobs these were). This approach 
has been used, in particular, to assess the extent to which employment structures in developed 
economies are polarising, due to the decline in mid-paid jobs, or upgrading as a result of growth in 
high-paid, high-skilled jobs.
The report examines the time profile of recent shifts in the employment structure, as it appears that 
the re-emergence of employment growth has coincided with a transition from the more polarised 
employment shifts of the peak recession years to a flatter, more equal distribution of employment 
across the wage distribution, with, if anything, a downward skew – in other words, greater growth 
in lower-paid employment. This raises the spectre of growing low-productivity employment, where 
output and, ultimately, living standards fail to rise despite an increase in job opportunities.
The report also synthesises the main findings from two other analyses of labour market developments 
that use a  jobs-based approach. The first centres on developments in six European countries – 
Germany, Spain, the UK, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland – since the 1970s. The second is recent 
work by a network of labour market researchers from outside Europe, which focuses on Australia, 
China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US.
Policy context
The EU’s Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth includes a commitment 
to fostering high levels of employment and productivity. This implies a renewed focus on the goal 
of ‘more and better jobs’ in the earlier Lisbon agenda. More jobs are needed to address the problem 
of lengthening unemployment queues. But Europe also needs better, more productive jobs if it is to 
increase living standards for its citizens in an expanding, integrated global economy.
The European Commission’s 2012 Employment Package (‘Towards a job-rich recovery’) identifies 
some sectors in which employment growth is considered most likely – health services, information 
and communication technologies, personal and household services, as well as the promising, if hard 
to define, category of ‘green jobs’. This report provides up-to-date data about employment levels and 
job quality in growing, and declining, sectors and occupations.
Key findings
Employment shifts in the EU, 2011–2014
Over the three-year period 2011 Q2–2014 Q2, employment growth in the EU was asymmetrically 
polarised, with the greatest growth in well-paid jobs, some modest growth in the lowest-paid jobs 
and declining employment in jobs in the middle of the wage distribution. There is a variety of 
patterns of employment shifts at Member State level, with most countries exhibiting either upgrading 
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or polarising shifts, but with a significant minority also downgrading (showing greater growth in 
lower-paid employment).
Employment levels in the EU have started to rise again since 2013 Q2, with net employment some 1.8 
million higher in 2014 Q2. Nonetheless, aggregate EU employment levels are still some four million 
lower than at the outset of the crisis six years ago.
Employment growth has strengthened, particularly in low-to-mid-paid jobs. Throughout the 
crisis and its immediate aftermath (2008–2013), employment grew only in jobs accounting for the 
highest-paid 20% of workers. As the recovery has become more established, lower-paid services jobs 
have accounted for a large share of recent growth.
Strong recent growth in the part-time share of employment has been the main cause of the trend 
of destandardisation in employment relationships. When jobs in the EU are classified into five 
categories of equal size (quintiles) based on wage, it is apparent that growth in permanent, full-time 
employment is increasingly confined to top-quintile, well-paid jobs; in all other quintiles of the wage 
distribution, it is decreasing.
Employment structure shifts: European comparison
The analysis of six European countries over more than four decades showed a surprising consistency 
in the overall patterns of structural change despite some short-term diversity and a few exceptions. 
Employment structures in Germany and the UK have been polarising since the early 1980s, whereas 
in Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland they have been more-or-less consistently upgrading since 
the 1970s (with some periods of sharp polarisation in recessions in Spain, and also in the 1980s in 
Ireland and Switzerland).
This diversity across countries took place against a background of very similar broad trends of 
structural change in the long run. Deindustrialisation tended to have similarly polarising effects 
everywhere (destroying employment in mid-paid jobs), but the overall patterns of structural change 
were determined to a greater extent by developments in the more dynamic service sector, which were 
more country-specific. The expansion of public sector employment, for instance, was generally linked 
to the growth of relatively high-paid occupations, but in the UK it also expanded the bottom quintiles 
after 1990, contributing to polarisation.
Although the analysis of longer-term developments uncovered a significant and consistent diversity 
across countries, it also showed some very important common trends. Most importantly, there was 
a consistent expansion of employment in high-paid jobs across countries and periods, contrasting 
with a very significant decrease in mid-paid and low-paid occupations across countries and periods.
Employment structure shifts: Global comparison
In the global comparison, two broadly similar patterns of employment shifts were apparent:
• the EU, Japan and the US showed polarised upgrading, with the greatest employment growth in 
well-paid jobs, plus a relative contraction of mid-paid jobs and some modest relative growth in 
low-paid jobs;
• Australia, China, Russia and South Korea showed upgrading, with the greatest employment 
growth in well-paid jobs and lowest employment growth in low-paid jobs.
Executive summary
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Recessions or periods of slowing growth were associated with more polarised employment shifts. The 
clearest examples of upgrading growth tended to be in economies experiencing higher output growth.
China was unique in the scale of its workforce and its pace of growth (in terms of output and 
employment). Employment grew by eight million each year, comparable to total employment growth 
in the EU for 2004–2013. Over the five-year period 2005–2010, over 50 million agriculture jobs were 
lost, but this was more than compensated for by net growth in employment in the manufacturing, 
construction and retail sectors, the results of a huge (but slowing) migration from rural China to the 
growing cities.

5Introduction
This report describes recent structural shifts in employment in European labour markets primarily in 
the period 2011–2014, using a jobs-based approach. It also summarises the work of two other projects 
that use a similar approach. The first of these examines longer-term shifts in employment structure in 
six European countries. The second looks at more recent shifts, from the 1990s and 2000s onwards, 
in a selection of ‘BRICs’1 countries – China and the Russian Federation – and developed countries – 
Australia, Japan, South Korea and the United States.
The jobs-based methodology allows the identification of how net employment shifts at country and 
aggregate EU level have been distributed across jobs in different quintiles of the wage distribution. 
In this analysis, a job is understood as a given occupation in a given sector, for example a teaching 
professional in the education sector or a sales worker in retail. The analysis breaks down employment 
into jobs so defined and then ranks them in terms of their job quality. The principal criterion for 
ranking jobs is the wage, although alternative job rankings based on the average educational 
level of job-holders and a multidimensional measure of non-pecuniary job quality have also been 
developed (see Eurofound, 2013, for details on construction of these alternative indices). A simple 
graphical representation of observed employment shifts in terms of wage (or education or job quality) 
quintiles shows whether recent employment growth is stronger at the top, middle or bottom of the job 
distribution and how it is distributed by gender, age, employment or professional status.
Labour market context
Aggregate labour market performance in Europe in mid-2014 remained problematic despite recent 
positive employment growth and declining unemployment levels for over 12 months. Unemployment 
was still very high at over 10% (and 11.5% in the euro zone Member States) and significantly higher 
than in the main comparator countries, Japan and the US (3.6% and 5.9% in November 2014, 
respectively). Employment levels were still some four million lower than at the outset of the crisis 
six years before, and over eight million more people were unemployed (24 million as opposed to 16 
million). Labour market performance like this is more-or-less unprecedented in recent European 
history, where recessions have generally been marked by slowing employment growth rather than 
net employment destruction. Europe’s economies and labour markets are still very much within the 
gravitational pull of the global financial crisis and the euro zone crisis that followed it.
It is prudent, therefore, not to be over-confident about the modest employment bounce since mid-
2013. A legacy of sovereign and private debt arising from the crises and the policies implemented to 
address these deficits will continue to impede growth. An additional concern has been below-trend 
structural growth forecasts in the developed world as a whole in line with predictions of ‘secular 
stagnation’. Even with minimally positive or negative real interest rates for much of the last six 
years, growth forecasts for the euro zone remain rooted around the 0.5%–1.5% level (IMF, 2014), 
significantly lower than the long-run 2% annual growth achieved previously with a  much less 
accommodating monetary policy. Forecast growth for 2015 is also a full percentage point lower in 
the euro zone (1.3%) compared with that of the advanced economies as a whole.
Additional unconventional monetary policy tools – ‘quantitative easing’ – have been used in Japan, 
the UK and the US in recent years, and the ECB sanctioned their deployment prior to this report 
being finalised. They appear to have had a positive differential impact on growth rates at the expense 
of weakened exchange rates. Superficially, in terms of falling unemployment rates, Japan and the US 
have also fared better than Europe, although in the case of the US a sharp decline in the number of 
1 An acronym referring to four countries with rapidly developing economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China.
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people active in the labour market means that the unemployment rate is an unreliable guide to the 
health of the US labour market. The employment rate – the share of the working age population in 
employment – has declined by nearly five percentage points in the US since 2007. Coincidentally, 
the employment rate has increased by around five percentage points in Germany in the same period 
while declining very marginally (by around one percentage point) in the EU as a whole.
Employment levels in the EU increased by some 1.8 million between the second quarter (Q2) 
of 2013 and 2014 Q2.2 Within the EU, there remains a large variation in national labour market 
performances, although differentials have tended to shrink in the last year as some of the economies 
most affected by the crisis – Ireland, Portugal and Spain – have enjoyed faster growth than countries 
where the economy and labour markets remained more resilient. Employment levels increased by 
similar amounts between 2013 Q2 and 2014 Q2 in Germany (103,000) and in Portugal (90,000), 
notwithstanding big differences in labour market size. In Spain, there was an increase of nearly 
200,000 jobs. These are minor turnarounds given the scale of recent employment destruction – 3.3 
million fewer people are employed in Spain now compared with six years ago – but they suggest that 
the period of sharpening divergence in EU national labour markets is coming to an end.
Only four countries experienced a contraction in employment between 2013 Q2 and 2014 Q2. The 
declines were marginal in the cases of Belgium and Italy but more significant in the cases of Estonia 
and the Netherlands (accounting for about 1% of each country’s employment).
By some margin, the most important contribution to employment growth in the EU came from the UK, 
which accounted for over 800,000 net new jobs over the 12-month period. Two other non-euro-zone 
countries – Poland and Hungary – were among those with the highest net (and relative) employment 
growth, recording 263,000 and 190,000 new jobs, respectively.
The Europe 2020 strategy has an overarching employment objective of a 75% employment rate 
amongst those aged 20–64.3 As Figure 1 highlights, the recession and its aftermath have set back 
progress towards this target. The overall EU employment rate declined from 70.5% in 2008 Q2 to 
68.8% in 2011 Q2 but increased to 69.3% in the subsequent three years.
2 According to EU-LFS data, the increase was just over 1.2 million. This, however, does not take account of a very significant break in the 
Romanian data in 2013–2014, apparently based on census revisions. An adjustment is made in this report to take account of the more likely 
real employment shifts in Romania. The practical impact of this is to reduce estimates of total employment in Romania for all quarters prior 
to 2014 by about 600,000. This, therefore, raises the estimate of net employment growth in Romania and in the EU as a whole.
3 Within the Europe 2020 framework, each Member State, with the exception of the UK, has set its own employment rate target or target 
range for 2020. These range from 62.9% in the case of Malta to ‘well over 80%’ in the case of Sweden. 
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Figure 1: EU28 employment rates (%) for 20–64‑year‑olds, 2008 Q2–2014 Q2
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Source: EU-LFS
Six ‘older’ Member States – Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – are 
already above the 75% target level. Of the remaining countries, 18 are within 10 percentage points of 
the target rate and 4 Mediterranean Member States – Croatia, Greece, Italy and Spain – are at least 
15 percentage points below the target rate.
Nearly all net employment growth has occurred in the service sector of the economy, notably the 
health, professional services, and hotel and restaurants sectors. The engine of growth in services 
employment has tended to shift from public services to private services, a predictable consequence 
of public spending cuts, whose impact can be seen clearly in the reduction of public administration 
employment levels by 400,000 (over 2.5%) since 2011.
There was a modest increase in manufacturing employment between 2013 Q2 and 2014 Q2 (up just 
over 400,000), but this comes after previous losses of nearly 5 million jobs between 2008 and 2013. 
The construction sector – probably the most cyclical of sectors in employment terms – continues to 
shed employment. A further 200,000 jobs in the sector were lost between 2013 Q2 and 2014 Q2, on 
top of the 3.5 million lost in the preceding five years.
Both manufacturing and construction continue to be male-dominated sectors, with low-to-medium 
average education levels. The disproportionate impact of the crisis on these sectors has meant that 
male, blue-collar workers were especially hard hit, notably during its early years.
The employment of younger workers has been affected in particular by reduced hiring levels and 
probably exacerbated by the increased likelihood of older workers working up to and beyond 65 
years of age. The fastest-growing five-year age cohorts in employment in relative terms are those 
aged 60–64 and 65–69. The number of people aged over 60 in the EU workforce has increased 
by more than 2.4 million since 2011. A  higher employment rate for older workers is no longer 
a specific, strategic EU employment objective, but it has been climbing throughout the crisis. The 
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50% employment rate target for 55–64-year-olds set in the Lisbon agenda, and not achieved within 
the original 2000–2010 time frame, was finally achieved in 2013 Q2 and had risen further to 51.7% 
by 2014 Q2. Overall, those in higher-skilled occupations, especially core-age and older workers with 
longer tenure have continued to experience much more benign labour market outcomes than their 
younger, lower- and medium-skilled counterparts, on whom the employment consequences of the 
crises have fallen hardest.
Jobs‑based approach: Methodology
The approach in this chapter is to focus on how the structure of employment in Europe has changed 
in the most recent three years (2011 Q2–2014 Q2).4 In order to do this, the ‘job’ is taken as the unit 
of analysis. Increasingly, EU employment policy is phrased in terms of ‘jobs’. ‘More and better jobs’ 
was the headline phrase of the Lisbon agenda, and the ‘New skills for new jobs’ initiative is central 
to its successor, Europe 2020.
A job here is defined as an occupation in a sector. This is an intuitively attractive definition and 
corresponds to what people think of when describing their job, or to how an employer advertises 
a new job opening – an administrator in the insurance industry, a doctor in the health sector.
This definition is useful for both theoretical and empirical reasons. The two concepts of occupation 
and sector correspond to two fundamental dimensions of the division of labour within and across 
organisations. The sector classification designates the horizontal distribution of economic activities 
across organisations generating different products and services. The occupation classification provides 
an implicit hierarchy of within-organisation roles – senior managers, line managers, professionals, 
associate professionals, production staff and so on. Established international classifications of 
occupation (ISCO, the International Standard Classification of Occupations) and sector (NACE, 
Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne) mean that 
it is relatively easy to operationalise the jobs-based approach using the standard labour market 
data sources, such as the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), with a good level of international 
comparability.
The jobs-based approach requires not only the definition of a  job in an intuitive, conceptually 
coherent and empirically practical way but also some means of evaluating these jobs in relation 
to their quality. The job-wage has been the main proxy of job quality in much jobs-based analysis, 
originating in the work of Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz in the 1990s and subsequently refined 
by Erik Olin Wright and Rachel Dwyer and others. The analysis that follows relies mainly on 
a wage-based measure to rank jobs.
4 In the analysis that follows, the time frame used is 2011 Q2–2014 Q2. Occasionally, shorthand reference in the text is made to 2011–
2014 and 2013–2014, but in all cases it is based on second-quarter data from the relevant year.
Introduction
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Methodological note on the jobs‑based approach
The main, simplified steps of the jobs-based approach are as follows:
1. Using the standard international classifications of occupation (ISCO-08) and sector 
(NACE Rev. 2.0) at two‑digit level, a matrix of jobs is created in each country. Each job is 
an occupation in a sector. In total, there are 43 two‑digit occupations and 88 two‑digit 
sectors, which generates 3,784 job cells. In practice, many of the theoretical job cells 
do not contain employment; there are unlikely to be any skilled agricultural workers 
in financial services, for example. The country total of job cells with employment varies 
between around 400 and just over 2,000 and is largely determined by country size and 
labour force survey sample size.
2. The jobs in each country are ranked, based on some ranking criterion, mainly 
the mean hourly wage. The job-wage rankings for each country used in this report 
are based on combining data from the EU‑LFS annual data files for 2011–2013 and 
aggregated data from the Structure of Earning Survey (SES) for 2010.5 These sources 
allowed the creation of country job-wage rankings for 28 Member States.
3. Jobs were allocated to quintiles in each country based on the job‑wage ranking for that 
country. The best‑paid jobs are assigned to quintile 5, the lowest‑paid to quintile 1. Each 
quintile in each country should represent as close as possible to 20% of employment in the 
starting period. Hereafter, the job‑to‑quintile assignments remain fixed for each country. 
The focus then is shifted to the EU-LFS employment data and the change in the stock of 
employment at quintile level in each country in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2 (or 2011 Q2–2014 Q2).
Figure 2 illustrates in simplified format the three steps outlined above, using some of 
the top-paid and lowest-paid jobs that employ large numbers at EU level as examples. 
(While the jobs are correctly assigned in terms of EU quintile, the individual job‑wage 
ranks, 1–4 and 1,105–1,108, are for illustrative purposes only.)
Figure 2: Job rankings and quintile assignments carried out for each country
5 Because the job-wage (and education) rankings have been recalculated using more recent years of EU-LFS data, there are some 
differences in results reported in this annual report and those in previous reports. In nearly all cases, the differences are minor.
Rank Sector
Quintiles
Low paid 20%
(skilled)
Mid-low paid
(skilled)
Mid-paid
(skilled)
Mid-high paid
(skilled)
High paid 20%
(skilled)
Occupation
1 Financial services Corporate managers
2 Legal/accounting Other professionals
3 Education Teaching professionals
4 Human health activities Life sciences and health professionals
...
...
1,105 Agriculture Skilled agriculture/fishery workers
1,106 Services to buildings Sales/services elementary occupations
1,107 Education Sales/services elementary occupations
1,108 Food manufacture Craft workers
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4. Net employment change between starting and concluding periods (in persons 
employed) for each quintile in each country is summed to establish whether net job 
growth has been concentrated in the top, middle or bottom of the employment 
structure. This generates a series of charts similar to Figure 3. Except where otherwise 
indicated, all charts in the report describe net employment change by quintile for the 
indicated country or for the EU as a whole. The EU aggregate charts are based on 
applying a common EU job‑wage ranking.
The resulting quintile charts give a simple, graphical representation of the extent of 
employment change in a given period, as well as an indication of how that change has 
been distributed across jobs of different pay. (A similar classification of jobs can be done 
using job‑holders’ skills or job quality more broadly defined as a ranking criterion.) 
Figure 3, for example, illustrates employment change for the EU28 during 2011 Q2–
2014 Q2 using the job‑wage quintiles. The pale blue bars show the change in the most 
recent 12 months, while the dark blue bars show the changes over the full three-year 
period. The figure should be read from the leftmost bar cluster (quintile 1, representing 
the lowest‑paid jobs) to the rightmost cluster (quintile 5, representing highest‑paid 
jobs). Net employment change is represented on the vertical axis, generally in thousands 
but sometimes as an annual percentage change. The fact that the 2011–2014 bars are 
below zero for the three middle quintiles indicates that there was net job destruction 
in the jobs assigned to these quintiles over the three‑year period.
Figure 3: Net employment change (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile, EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
Note: EU28 data; Q2 data in each year.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)
This method also offers further possibilities of breaking down these net employment 
changes by such categories as gender, employment or professional status, working 
time category (full time or part time), which are used later in this chapter. For a more 
extensive description of the data-processing involved, please refer to Annex 1. Further 
background documentation includes Eurofound (2008b), as well as extensive material 
in the annexes of previous European Jobs Monitor (EJM) annual reports, where the 
same jobs approach was used – see Eurofound (2008a, 2011, 2013, 2014).
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1Employment shifts in the EU, 
2011–2014
This chapter uses the jobs approach to describe employment developments by job-wage quintile 
during the period 2011 Q2–2014 Q2. Overall trends in the EU are looked at first, with the varying 
patterns of change in the individual Member States then described. Thereafter, employment change 
is broken down into its components in terms of major sectoral aggregations, worker characteristics 
(gender and age) and employment characteristics (full-time or part-time, temporary or permanent 
contract). The objective is to show how the broad outlines of employment change identified in the 
quintile charts intersect with other dimensions of labour market development, such as the rapid 
recent growth in part-time work, the increasing share of female employment and the increasing share 
of services in total employment.
The three-year period between 2011 Q2 and 2014 Q2 included the ‘double-dip’ recession in which 
some 1.3 million job losses were added to the 5 million previously lost during the global financial 
crisis period (2008–2010). The most recent year has seen some significant employment growth, with 
approximately 1.8 million net new jobs created in the EU in the 12 months to 2014 Q2.
The sign of the employment shifts has changed therefore – from negative to positive – but the nature, 
or quality, of the shifts also appears to have changed. Since 2008, successive EJM annual reports have 
demonstrated that recessionary job destruction was concentrated in the middle and mid-low wage 
quintiles, notably as a result of the disproportionate share of job losses in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors (Figure 4). These are sectors in which employment is predominantly in mid-paid 
jobs. Employment continued to grow in well-paid, high-skilled jobs in the top quintile throughout 
2008–2013, albeit at a more modest pace than in the long period of employment expansion that 
preceded the 2008 global crisis. Bottom-quintile employment also tended to be more resilient than 
that in the middle quintiles, suffering relatively modest losses. The most recent data represents 
something of a break from this pattern.
Figure 4:  Employment change (% per annum) by job‑wage quintile, EU27, 2008 Q2–2014 Q2
Note: EU27, omitting Croatia for comparability.
Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)
The pattern of employment growth in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2 is quite distinct from the asymmetrical 
polarisation of the earlier two periods. Perhaps the most interesting feature is that the largest share 
of the net new employment created since 2013 Q2 has been in the bottom three job-wage quintiles.
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Various explanations can be offered for this new pattern. It could be that there has been a bounce 
in employment in those jobs or quintiles most affected by the two waves of recession experienced in 
recent years; in other words, there has been a recovery or replacement of jobs previously destroyed 
as market conditions improve.
A second, related explanation could be that the resumption of something approaching a trend of 1% 
annual employment growth has been achieved, mainly through the creation of lower-quality jobs. 
This would be consistent with healthier levels of employment growth, alongside low levels of output 
growth and continuing wage stagnation in many Member States.
These points will be drawn out with reference to individual countries and using data covering shifts 
over 2011–2014 in order to see to what extent patterns observed in the EU aggregate data are evident 
also at Member State level and over a somewhat longer period.
Up to now, the debate about shifts in the employment structure in developed economies has 
largely been oriented around two main patterns of growth – upgrading and polarisation. Each has 
its own underpinning narrative – ‘skill-biased technological change’ in the case of upgrading and 
‘routine-biased technological change’ in the case of polarisation.
Upgrading and polarising employment shifts
With upgrading employment shifts, the pattern expected is a more-or-less linear improvement in 
employment structure, with the greatest employment growth in high-paid (or high-skilled) jobs and 
the weakest growth in low-paid (or low-skilled) jobs, with middling growth in the middle. With 
polarisation, the main difference is that the relative positions in terms of employment dynamics of 
the middle and bottom of the job distribution are swapped: employment growth is weakest in the 
middle and relatively stronger at both ends of the job distribution, leading to a ‘hollowed middle’.
The main explanation of the differences in the two accounts is the contention by exponents of 
routine-biased technological change that those jobs most vulnerable to technological displacement 
are routine jobs (clerical and manufacturing or production jobs), which happen to predominate in 
the middle of the wage distribution in developed economies. Less routine jobs – personal services 
at the bottom of the distribution and knowledge-intensive professional services at the top – are less 
vulnerable to replacement by machines.
In practice, employment changes observed at country level only approximate such schematic shapes; 
they are a mix of both or are some hybrid, less discernible shape. In the EU as a whole, over the 
periods covered by this report’s analysis from 1995, employment shifts have tended to be upgrading 
but with some evidence of polarisation, which becomes more obvious in recessions.
What both patterns show – and what the theoretical explanations that predict them agree on – is 
relatively strong top-quintile employment growth, and this has been, to date, one of the empirical 
regularities of jobs-based analysis in developed-world labour markets. There has been greater 
employment growth in well-paid jobs employing those with generally high levels of education or 
training than in mid-paid or less well-paid jobs.
It is suggestive that a recent, more long-run analysis of the US labour market by David Autor, one of 
the main proponents of routine-biased technological change/employment polarisation, has pointed 
to relatively stronger growth in the lower part of the wage distribution in the US during 1999–2007, 
accompanied by stagnant growth in the middle and top of the wage distribution (Autor, 2010, p. 3). 
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This analysis also finds echoes in the conclusions of previous work on the US and selected European 
labour markets. In the US, patterns of employment shift tended to change in a negative direction each 
decade from the 1960s through the 1990s (Wright and Dwyer, 2003). What was a clear upgrading 
picture in the US in the 1960s became progressively more polarised in succeeding decades.
In Eurofound’s work covering employment from the mid-1990s, a somewhat similar trajectory has 
been observed in the EU aggregate data, albeit over different periods. The pre-crisis employment 
expansion was mainly upgrading but with some polarisation. The crisis itself has been clearly 
polarising but with some upgrading (the top quintile continued to grow). The most recent pattern 
(2013 Q2–2014 Q2) could be described as polarising or downgrading, with some justification for 
either description, but not as upgrading.
Of course, not too much should be read into results based on just one year’s data. As previously noted, 
there may be some statistical ‘noise’ in the year-on-year changes that tends to disappear over longer 
time frames. In an earlier analysis of 1998–2007, for example, downgrading was not observed in any 
Member State (Eurofound, 2008). It is the task of the EJM to identify changing patterns of employment 
but, at the same time, most applications of the jobs-based analysis tend to use multiyear periods – up 
to a decade in much of the US research – in order to capture change in the employment structure that 
is more likely to be structural in nature. This is the value of the approach. Changing patterns identified 
using one year’s data are best treated as interesting food for thought and the basis of hypotheses to 
be tested with further waves of data, rather than definitive evidence of anything in particular.
A second caveat as regards the 2013–2014 EU aggregate data is that the nature of the employment 
shifts tends to be heavily influenced by the UK data, given its very significant contribution to 
aggregate EU net employment growth in the period. The jobs-based approach by construction 
emphasises marginal employment change from one period to the next. In the UK, as will be 
apparent, employment growth for the most recent year is also skewed towards the bottom quintiles. 
A simple check – omitting the UK data from the EU aggregate employment shift for 2013 Q2–2014 
Q2 – recasts the quintile chart in a more upgrading light by reducing the observed employment 
growth in the lower two quintiles. What is clear, however, is that the most recent data – not just in 
the UK but also in Germany, Italy and quite a few other, less populous Member States – points to 
relatively faster growth in low–paid jobs in 2013–2014 than has been the case previously. As already 
indicated, recent US research suggests that here, too, employment growth in the immediate pre-crisis 
period was downgrading. Neither of the main orthodox, technology-based explanations of shifts in 
labour demand is consistent with such downgrading employment shifts. But to the extent that the 
change of pattern persists, it will require a new, broader explanatory framework. Some of the main 
determinants that should figure in such a  framework were outlined in last year’s annual report 
(Eurofound, 2014) and include trade and labour market institutions in addition to use of technology 
and technological change.
In any case, for a number of reasons, it will be interesting to see if the recent relative downgrading 
persists in the employment structure. Firstly, developments in the US employment structure 
have tended to prefigure those in the EU if one looks at previous jobs-based analysis. If relative 
downgrading continues to happen in the EU, similar patterns to those that Autor (2010) has presented 
for the US in the immediate pre-crisis period may be observed. A possible explanation is that policies 
of labour market deregulation and liberalisation have tended to be implemented first in the US before 
being ‘exported’ to the EU. For example, the 1994 OECD jobs study, which influenced subsequent 
EU employment policy, offered a largely US solution to the diagnosed European problem of high 
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structural unemployment. Its recommendations included introducing greater flexibility in pay and 
in hiring and firing and reducing incentives to remain unemployed, and were predicated on lower 
unemployment rates in the US – where such policies were largely already in place – compared to 
continental European countries where, with some exceptions, they were not.
Secondly, at present, most forecasts are for modest but increasing output growth in the EU in 
2015–2016. If the employment gains that result are to be concentrated in the lower rather than the 
upper quintiles of the wage structure, this could have serious implications for training and education 
policies. It is possible that European educational structures – currently well on the way to meeting 
their Europe 2020 strategic objectives in terms of the share of 30–34-year-olds having a degree – may 
be producing a surfeit of graduates for the available jobs requiring a third-level qualification. High 
levels of education may be intrinsically a public good, but frustration is likely at an individual level 
because of over-qualification and mismatches between jobs and skills if education levels outstrip 
demand for high-skilled jobs in the labour market.
Finally, downgrading employment shifts in developed economies also feed into the topical current 
preoccupation with secular stagnation and the possibility that the developed world is entering 
a new longer-term phase of reduced growth (about 1% per annum output growth compared to 
the recent long-run average of about 2%). The expression has various connotations relating to 
the changing global division of labour, monetary policy, demographic ageing and the declining 
economic returns to technology and innovation but, at base, it expresses an anxiety about the 
capacity of developed societies to generate sustainable increases in productivity associated with 
rising prosperity and living standards. There is, for example, an important debate in the UK about 
the country’s current ‘productivity puzzle’ (Barnett et al, 2014), where economic recovery is more 
apparent in the employment data than in output data. As discussed earlier, the UK has contributed 
disproportionately to recent employment growth in the EU, but productivity growth continues to be 
very weak, precisely the opposite of what has occurred in post-recession, jobless recoveries going 
back to the 1990s. This, in turn, is linked to a debate over the ‘living wage’ in a context of declining 
average real-wage levels during 2008–2013. Unexpected developments like this are a warning that 
this might be a period of transition.
Employment shifts in Member States
Figure 5 presents net employment change between 2011 Q2 and 2014 Q2 by wage quintile for all 
Member States.
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Figure 5: Employment change (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile, EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Note: Data for Germany for 2012 Q2–2014 Q2; see Annex 2 for treatment of data breaks in France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Romania. Annex 3 includes data tables of the main aggregate employment shifts by Member State.
Source: EU-LFS
Over the three-year period 2011–2014, the countries with an obvious downgrading pattern of 
employment shift were Germany (2012–2014), Hungary, Italy and Slovakia. In each, employment 
growth was strongest in the lowest-paid jobs and weaker (or negative in the case of Italy and Slovakia) 
in higher-paid jobs. Over the most recent 12-month period for which there is data, 2013 Q2–2014 Q2, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Slovenia and the UK have also demonstrated bottom-skewed employment 
growth. Recent employment dynamics have also been polarising in Austria. As already suggested, the 
UK figures strongly influence the overall EU aggregate pattern, given relatively dynamic employment 
growth in 2013–2014, but there are other countries where increasingly bottom-skewed employment 
creation is contributing to more of a downgrading pattern.
With reference to the three-year bars (2011–2014), the most obvious examples of countries where 
the employment structure is upgrading are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Sweden. There is no obvious commonality in this group. In 
previous annual reports, attention was drawn to what appeared to be an association between 
the severity of impact of the recession on national labour markets and the resulting employment 
shifts. Polarising shifts were more likely in severely affected labour markets (Greece, Ireland and 
Spain), while upgrading shifts were more likely in Member States where the economy and labour 
market were more resilient to the effects of the crisis. It is less easy to sustain this association 
between employment performance and the nature of the employment shifts in view of the current 
country data. For example, neither of the two national labour markets that have contributed most to 
absolute employment growth in 2011–2014 (Germany, by 900,000 jobs, and the UK, by 1,400,000 
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jobs) exhibits upgrading. In the UK, the pattern has been clearly polarising, with a tendency more 
recently to bottom-skewed growth as net employment creation has accelerated. In Germany, growth 
over 2012 Q2–2014 Q2 has been mainly in the middle and bottom of the wage distribution.
Member States with clear polarising employment shifts in 2011–2014 include Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK. All are countries that endured severe recessions in the wake of 
either the global financial crisis or the euro zone crisis. One of the most obvious manifestations of 
this was a construction sector bust affecting middle-quintile employment. As employment has begun 
to recover in many of these Member States, it is interesting to note the diversity in the qualitative 
patterns behind the quantitative improvements. Employment growth in 2013–2014 has been mainly 
in low-paid jobs in Greece, Ireland and the UK, in mid-paid jobs in Estonia and Spain, and has been 
polarised in Cyprus.
In summary, there is large variation in the short-term patterns of employment shift across countries 
but with some clear cases of upgrading and polarisation, a  smaller number of cases of clear 
downgrading, and a large number of hybrid or irregular patterns. At the aggregate EU level over 
2011–2014, the pattern is one of upgrading, with some modest polarisation; more recent employment 
growth (2013–2014) has been skewed towards lower-quality jobs.
Growing and declining jobs
The quintile charts show where in the job-wage distribution employment is being created and 
destroyed, but they do not identify the specific jobs responsible for the observed shifts. In practice, 
even though the number of jobs with employment identified using the jobs-based approach ranges 
from around 400 to 2,000 by country, depending on size, a small number of jobs account for a high 
share of employment in all countries. A quarter of EU employment is concentrated in just 11 jobs and 
a half in around 60 jobs. Because of their size, it is employment shifts in the jobs that employ large 
numbers that tend to influence the shape of the quintiles most.
Table 1: Top 10 jobs by employment, greatest growth and greatest loss, EU, 
2011 Q2–2014 Q2
Top 10 jobs by employment
Occupation Sector Quintiles Employment 
(thousands)
% change 
p.a. 
2011–2014
Wage Education Job  
quality
Sales workers Retail trade 1 2 3 12,021 0.0
Teaching professionals Education 5 5 5 9,591 0.5
Market-oriented skilled 
agricultural workers
Crop and animal production, 
etc.
2 1 2 6,752 ‑1.4
Health professionals Human health activities 5 5 3 4,742 2.4
Personal service workers Food and beverage service 
activities
1 2 1 4,096 2.2
Building and related trades 
workers
Specialised construction 
activities
2 2 2 4,035 -5.2
Drivers and mobile plant 
operators
Land transport and 
transport via pipelines
3 2 1 3,864 -1.0
Health associate 
professionals
Human health activities 4 4 3 3,732 -0.1
Business and administration 
associate professionals
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
4 4 5 3,018 ‑1.3
Building and related trades 
workers
Construction of buildings 3 1 1 2,214 ‑3.4
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Top 10 jobs by relative employment growth
Occupation Sector Quintiles Employment 
(thousands)
% change 
p.a. 
2011–2014
Wage Education Job 
quality
Information and 
communications technology 
professionals
Computer programming, 
consultancy, etc.
5 5 5 1,426 10.0
Business and administration 
professionals
Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy 
activities
5 5 5 613 9.2
Legal, social, cultural 
and related associate 
professionals
Education 3 4 3 936 7.2
Legal, social, cultural 
and related associate 
professionals
Residential care activities 3 4 4 504 5.5
Personal care workers Activities of households 
as employers of domestic 
personnel
1 2 2 516 5.4
Personal care workers Residential care activities 2 3 3 1,935 5.4
Stationary plant and 
machine operators
Manufacture of food 
products
2 1 1 717 4.9
Health associate 
professionals
Residential care activities 2 4 3 591 4.7
Cleaners and helpers Services to buildings and 
landscape activities
1 1 1 2,183 4.2
Legal, social and cultural 
professionals
Creative, arts and 
entertainment activities
4 5 3 623 3.8
Top 10 jobs by relative employment decline
Occupation Sector Quintiles Employment 
(thousands)
% change 
p.a. 
2011–2014
Wage Education Job  
quality
Customer services clerks Financial service activities 4 4 4 928 ‑5.3
Building and related 
trades workers, excluding 
electricians
Specialised construction 
activities
2 2 2 4,035 -5.2
Sales workers Wholesale trade 2 3 4 962 -5.0
Cleaners and helpers Human health activities 1 1 2 527 ‑4.7
Drivers and mobile plant 
operators
Wholesale trade 2 1 2 544 ‑3.5
Building and related 
trades workers, excluding 
electricians
Construction of buildings 3 1 1 2,214 ‑3.4
Business and administration 
associate professionals
Retail trade 3 4 4 626 ‑3.3
General and keyboard clerks Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security
3 4 4 1,327 ‑3.2
Labourers in mining, 
construction, manufacturing 
and transport
Wholesale trade 2 1 1 505 -2.8
Personal service workers Education 2 3 4 510 -2.5
Note: EU28, 2014 Q2 data for top 10 jobs by employment. Figures for average annual percentage growth (2011 Q2–2014 Q2) 
in the last column are calculated based on data from 25 Member States (excluding France, Germany and the Netherlands due 
to classification breaks in these countries) and are based on large-employing jobs at EU28 level (500,000+ employees) only.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ calculations)
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The first part of Table 1 shows that the two largest-employing jobs in the EU – sales workers in retail 
(12 million) and teaching professionals in education (9.6 million) – had stable employment over the 
three-year period, with a very modest increase recorded in teaching professionals. Biggest absolute 
and relative job losses continued to occur in construction sector jobs. Employment in this sector 
continues to contract at aggregate EU level six years on from the construction busts that accompanied 
the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Building workers and those in related trades in the distinct 
specialised construction activities and construction of buildings sectors suffered annual employment 
declines of between 3.4% and 5.2%. Relatively greatest growth occurred in large-employing service 
jobs at the top (health professionals) and the bottom (personal service workers in food and beverage 
service activities) of the wage distribution.
This pattern is also apparent when looking at large-employing jobs outside the top 10. The second 
and third parts of the table list fast-growing and fast-declining jobs after restricting the job sample 
to those 74 jobs (occupation by sector) employing at least 500,000 people in the EU. The fastest 
annual employment growth (10%) has been recorded in the job of information and communications 
technology (ICT) professional in computer programming and consultancy, but other lower-level 
service jobs, such as personal care worker in various sectors, have also experienced fast growth.
The greatest relative decline in employment was in customer service clerks in financial services, 
probably reflecting the twin impacts of post-crisis job-cutting and the migration online of basic 
bank-telling functions. Aside from the construction sector jobs already mentioned, there are three 
other noteworthy features in the list of fast-contracting jobs. Firstly, the list comprises mainly low-paid 
and mid-paid jobs. There are no well-paid, top-quintile jobs on it; this is the corollary of the general 
resilience of top-quintile employment growth. Secondly, there are three predominantly state-paid 
jobs on the list, including clerical grades in the public administration, reflecting pressures on the 
public sector pay bill post-2011. Finally, the appearance of four retail or wholesale sector jobs on 
the list suggests the strong impact of forces of technological displacement of labour in these sectors 
(resulting from the spread of self-service and online shopping). It may also relate to the post-crisis 
rationalisation of retail activity in the EU, evident, for example, in the rapid cross-border spread of 
large, discount retailers and the associated decline of smaller retail outlets, and the demise of large, 
traditional retailers such as Woolworths in the UK and Arcandor in Germany.
Where are jobs being created and destroyed?
Employment destruction during the post-crisis period was highly concentrated in two sectors – 
construction and manufacturing – with net losses of over eight million jobs during 2008–2013. 
Employment declined consistently in both broad sectors over the period. During the last year (2013 
Q2–2014 Q2), aggregate EU manufacturing employment experienced growth for the first time since 
2007, growing by just over half a million jobs, while the construction sector continued to shed 
employment, albeit at a slower rate. There were around 200,000 fewer construction jobs in 2014 Q2 
compared to 12 months previously. The preponderance of mid-paid and mid-low-paid employment in 
manufacturing and construction was the principal factor behind the sharp employment polarisation 
observed during the crisis, as job destruction in these sectors tended to ‘hollow out’ the employment 
structure. The growing share of service sector employment accounted for all net employment growth, 
and this has tended to be concentrated in the top two quintiles of the wage distribution.
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With the resumption of aggregate employment growth, one can anticipate a change in the shape or 
pattern of employment shifts in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2. This can be observed in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Year‑on‑year employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and broad 
sector, EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
-500
0
500
1,000
2011–2012 2012–2013
-500
0
500
1,000
2013–2014
-500
0
500
1,000
Manufacturing Construction Services
Note: The broad sectors of utilities and the primary sector are omitted.
Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculation)
There are a  number of points worth noting in Figure 6. Employment continued to polarise in 
2011–2013 (albeit asymmetrically with an upward skew), after the peak years of the crisis. This was 
a consequence of continuing employment destruction in the construction and manufacturing sectors 
at the same time as services employment grew in the top quintiles.
In 2013–2014, there was a significant change in employment shifts in all three broad sector groupings. 
Net employment losses were pared in the construction sector and were confined to jobs in the two 
lowest quintiles. Manufacturing contributed significantly to employment growth in all three top 
quintiles, with the gains more-or-less equally distributed across the three. Meanwhile, the service 
sector made by far the largest contribution to net employment growth in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2, but the 
nature of this growth was less upgrading than before. Services employment grew in all quintiles 
except the mid-high-paid quintile, with greatest net growth in the bottom quintile. This is the main 
factor behind the change in the overall pattern from one of asymmetrical polarisation to one of 
more-or-less evenly distributed growth in 2013–2014.
In manufacturing, recent employment growth appears to be broad-based and distributed across 
many jobs in skilled blue-collar and white-collar grades. The five manufacturing jobs with the greatest 
employment growth were science and engineering associate professionals in food manufacturing 
and chemicals manufacturing; assemblers in auto manufacturing and metal manufacturing; and 
machinery and related craft workers in fabricated metal products manufacturing. All five jobs are 
either in the mid-paid or mid-high-paid quintile.
Services employment growth has spread down the wage distribution. Employment growth in 2013 
Q2–2014 Q2 was as likely to take place in lower-paid jobs as in higher-paid jobs, marking a sharp 
change from previous years. There were, for example, over 200,000 new personal service workers 
in the food and beverage sector. This was the job contributing most to services employment growth. 
An important qualification is that much of this net employment growth in lower-level services took 
place in the UK, which, as already noted, has a disproportionate influence on the aggregate picture 
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because it contributed nearly half of net EU employment growth across all quintiles over the 12-
month period.
Service sector jobs contributing most to employment growth
Services account for 7 out of 10 jobs in Europe, and this sector’s share of overall employment is 
growing as that of the manufacturing and the primary sectors declines. There were 2.8 million 
net new service sector jobs in 2014 Q2 compared with 2011 Q2. Figure 7 differentiates between 
growth in three areas of the sector: public knowledge-intensive services (public KIS); private 
knowledge-intensive services (private KIS); and less knowledge-intensive services (LKIS).6 The left 
panel shows changes over the earlier two-year period (2011 Q2–2013 Q2), while the right shows just 
the most recent changes (2013 Q2–2014 Q2).
Aggregate growth has been more-or-less equally shared between public and private KIS, with LKIS 
sectors also contributing some growth, mainly in the bottom two quintiles but also in the top quintile 
(as a result of growth in professional jobs in the wholesale and retail sector).
Figure 7: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and service sector grouping, 
EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Private KIS – comprising a broad range of activities including media, ICT, consulting, advertising, 
financial, legal services and accounting – accounted for the majority of top-quintile employment 
growth, adding just over 800,000 well-paid jobs during 2011 Q2–2014 Q2. Specific jobs in this 
category include ICT professionals in computer programming, as well as business and administrative 
professionals in head office and management consultancy activities, the two fastest-growing big jobs 
as previously indicated (see Table 1 above).
Public KIS – comprising health, education and public administration – added employment in the 
lowest quintile. This was as a result of strong growth in employment of cleaners and helpers in 
health, residential care and social work activities. Public KIS also contributed to growth in the top 
two quintiles, mainly as a result of growing numbers of health professionals in the health sector.
6 This breakdown relies on the Eurostat aggregation of services sectors into ‘knowledge-intensive services’ (KIS) and ‘less knowledge-intensive 
services’ (LKIS). As there is no specific question in the EU-LFS regarding the public or private status of the respondent’s employer, it is not 
possible to estimate accurately the respective shares of public and private sector services employment. To make the distinction in this report, 
the KIS category has been further broken down into public and private service components. Public KIS comprises the following NACE sector 
categories: public administration, social security and defence, education, and human health activities. Private KIS comprises all remaining 
‘knowledge-intensive services’ (see Annex 4 for a full list). It should be noted that as a significant minority of workers in the health and 
education sectors are in fact private sector employees, the public KIS category is an imprecise proxy of public sector employment. 
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There were two noteworthy recent developments in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2. The first is the resumption 
of public KIS employment growth in 2013–2014. The previous two years, 2011–2013, marked the 
beginning of major post-crisis public sector retrenchment in many Member States, and there was no 
growth in these sectors at aggregate EU level in this period (employment growth in growing quintiles 
matched decline in declining quintiles). An important qualification here is that there is likely to be 
a growing share of private sector employment in the traditionally predominantly state-funded sectors 
of health and education, as well as increased levels of outsourcing in these sectors and in the core 
public administration (Eurofound, 2015). In other words, some of the employment growth attributed 
to public KIS in Figure 7 is likely in reality to be in the private sector.
The second development is that most of the recent growth in services employment has been 
bottom-skewed, with the greatest growth in low-paid, bottom-quintile jobs. Previously, services 
employment has tended to be very much top-skewed. This fresh surge of low-paid employment has 
been in jobs such as the cleaner and helper jobs identified above (in the public KIS sectors) and in 
retail sales workers and personal service workers in the food and beverage sector (in LKIS).
Patterns of employment change by worker characteristics
In the sections that follow, recent employment change (2011 Q2–2014 Q2) is broken down by job-wage 
quintile, according to the background variables of gender, educational attainment and age, and by 
various employment status dichotomies: full time and part time; self-employment and employee; and 
fixed-term and permanent contract. Following on from the discussion in the previous chapter, the 
analysis also tries to identify any recent shifts in the pattern of employment change by comparing 
year-on-year growth.
Male employment growth catching up
Since 2008, the EU gender employment gap has contracted by some 2 percentage points, reflecting 
the greater impact of the crisis in sectors that employ men predominantly, especially in its early 
2008–2010 phase. Male employment, especially in manufacturing and construction, contracted very 
sharply, while sectors such as health and education, which predominantly employ women, continued 
to add new jobs. Women now account for 46% of total employment in the EU. They outnumber men 
in the Latvian and Lithuanian workforces and are close to parity (at more than 48%) in Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France and Portugal.
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Figure 8: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and gender, EU, 
2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)
In the period 2011 Q2–2013 Q2, women continued to fare better than men numerically, mainly 
as a  result of the continuing sectoral composition effects already mentioned; construction and 
manufacturing were still the main sectors shedding employment. As Figure 8 shows, during this 
period of net employment destruction, women accounted for the majority of new well-paid jobs 
and were much less affected by the sharp employment declines in mid-low-paid and mid-paid jobs. 
Employments shifts were more polarising for men and more upgrading for women.
Employment growth in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2 was more evenly balanced by gender. The biggest difference 
from the previous two-year period is the recovery of male employment in low-paid and mid-paid 
jobs. To a certain extent, this growth is a replacement of previously shed employment. The biggest 
rise in male employment in an individual job, for example, was that of metal, machinery and related 
trades workers in fabricated metal products. This job had previously shed over 100,000 jobs between 
2011 Q2 and 2013 Q2 and had contracted even faster in the period going back to 2008. This is 
a classically male, industrial job: 96% of workers in this job in the EU are men. With the resumption 
of manufacturing employment growth, it has recovered some of its previous losses.
Male employment has also been growing in lower-paid services, often in jobs that have been 
predominantly female until now. Two of the fastest-growing jobs for male employment have been 
personal service workers in the food and beverages sector and cleaners and helpers in building services.
Net employment growth not confined to third‑level graduates
One of the headline Europe 2020 policy targets for the end of the decade is for 40% of those aged 
30–34 to be third-level graduates. This should be comfortably met as in 2013 the rate was 36.9% 
and had increased by around a percentage point each year since 2010. This educational upgrading 
and the expansion of the tertiary education system that sustains it is the supply side response to the 
increasing skill demands of European economies. The canonical theory of shifts in labour demand 
is that of skill-biased technological change, which holds that technological advances increase the 
demand for higher-skilled workers, while decreasing the demand for lower-skilled workers – often 
through replacement of routine jobs by automation.
As presented in previous jobs-based research (Eurofound 2008a, 2011, 2013, 2014), this theory finds 
broad support from recent European employment data. Since 1995, the most consistent development 
at aggregate EU level has been relatively faster growth in well-paid, high-skilled jobs.
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Figure 9 captures – and exaggerates, given strong cohort effects – some of the dynamics of this ‘race 
between technology and education’ (Goldin and Katz, 2009). In this narrative, collective advances 
in the supply of human capital through the education system try to keep up with the increasing skill 
demands in developed economies brought about by technological advances. With both processes 
advancing together in synchronisation, as they largely did until the 1980s and 1990s in the US, 
increased productivity and rising living standards should result.
Supporting evidence from the EU data is that net employment growth has benefited third-level 
graduates, especially in the top quintile. Here, a third-level credential is increasingly a requirement 
of entry to the labour market. However, even in the lowest quintiles, graduates account for most 
employment growth, which raises the problem of possible over-qualification while also implying 
a possible glut of graduate-level labour in many Member States. As Marin (2014) points out, referring 
to World Input-Output Database data, the rate of expansion of adults with a third-level degree has 
been much higher in many EU Member States compared to the US (excepting Germany) since the mid-
1990s, suggesting that ‘education policy in Europe was far too aggressive, given the demand for skills’.
Figure 9: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and educational level, EU, 
2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)
Job destruction in the ‘second recession’ of 2011–2013 exclusively affected those with lower-level 
qualifications. As aggregate employment growth returned in 2013–2014 and some labour markets 
began to tighten, the chances to secure employment increased for those people who had completed 
secondary education. This growth was not limited to the lowest quintile – though it was highest 
here – but included jobs in the mid-paid and mid-high-paid quintiles.
Figure 9 conveys the extent of the transformation of the workforce in terms of educational attainment – 
even over a relatively short period of three years. Older generations with lower levels of education 
retire or depart the labour market to be replaced by better-educated younger and core-age workers. 
In 2014 Q2, there were over six million more graduates in employment in the EU compared to three 
years previously. The pace of this recomposition appears to be most rapid during periods of net 
employment destruction, which disproportionately affect low-skilled and medium-skilled workers 
while, in relative terms, favouring graduates.
In summary, labour markets – especially the UK labour market but also, for example, labour markets 
in Ireland, Hungary and Germany – appear again to be offering greater employment opportunities 
to those with completed secondary as well as tertiary education, and this is one of the main reasons 
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behind the most recent employment recovery in low-paid and mid-paid jobs. The broader pattern, 
however, underlines that a third-level degree is increasingly a prerequisite, but not a guarantee, of 
employment in mid-paid and higher-paid jobs.
Rapid workforce ageing
Employment levels have increased for all five-year age categories above 45 years and have declined 
for all those below 45. However, this is in part due to demographic shifts. Table 2 controls for broader 
population ageing by showing the employment rate changes for each five-year age group between 
2011 Q2 and 2014 Q2. As can be seen, even with this adjustment, there is a dramatic increase in 
employment rates of older workers, notably those in the pre-retirement cohorts, 55–59 years and 
60–64 years, but also in the 65–69 age group (although this latter cohort is relatively marginal in 
terms of headcount). Over the same period, employment rates have declined for younger age cohorts 
(aged less than 35 years).
Table 2: Employment rate (2014 Q2) and change (2011 Q2–2014 Q2), by age and job‑wage 
quintiles
Employment rate (%) in 2014 Q2 decomposed by wage quintile
15–19 yrs 20–24 yrs 25–29 yrs 30–34 yrs 35–39 yrs 40–44 yrs 45–49 yrs 50–54 yrs 55–59 yrs 60–64 yrs 65–69 yrs 70–74 yrs
Quintile 1 6.9 15.4 14.9 13.8 14.1 14.6 14.9 14.1 12.0 7.1 2.5 1.3
Quintile 2 3.4 11.4 13.6 13.9 14.3 15.0 15.2 15.0 13.3 7.9 3.0 1.8
Quintile 3 2.2 9.9 14.0 14.7 15.6 15.8 16.1 15.8 13.6 6.7 1.6 0.7
Quintile 4 1.3 7.9 15.2 16.6 16.7 16.6 16.0 15.0 12.6 6.5 1.9 0.8
Quintile 5 0.2 3.9 13.6 18.3 19.0 18.3 17.3 16.2 14.1 8.4 2.5 1.0
Total 14.1 48.5 71.4 77.3 79.6 80.3 79.5 76.2 65.6 36.6 11.5 5.5
Percentage point change in employment rate 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
15–19 yrs 20–24 yrs 25–29 yrs 30–34 yrs 35–39 yrs 40–44 yrs 45–49 yrs 50–54 yrs 55–59 yrs 60–64 yrs 65–69 yrs 70–74 yrs
Quintile 1 -0.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.0
Quintile 2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 ‑0.4 -0.2 ‑0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.1
Quintile 3 0.1 ‑0.3 ‑0.4 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.1
Quintile 4 0.1 ‑0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 ‑0.4 -0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1
Quintile 5 0.0 0.0 ‑0.4 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.2 0.2
Total -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 ‑0.4 0.7 0.5 -0.6 0.2 3.1 4.8 0.9 0.3
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)
Breaking this down by job-wage quintile, the decline in the employment rate for the younger age 
cohort is concentrated in mid-paid jobs; there is an increase in employment rates in low-paid jobs for 
those aged 20–39. For the core-age cohorts (35–54 years), despite modest employment rate increases, 
the profile of employment shifts was more clearly upgrading, with the top-quintile employment rate 
growing relatively fastest amongst those aged 30–49 years. Among older age groups (55 and over), 
employment (rate) growth was more-or-less evenly distributed across the job-wage distribution.
Patterns of employment change by employment status
A decreasing share of European workers are in full-time, permanent employment, but this traditional 
core employment status still describes some 58% of them. There is a wide variation across Member 
States, with only one in three Dutch workers having core employment status compared with over 
80% of workers in Estonia, Bulgaria and Latvia. There is also great diversity across the EU in 
the composition of non-standard employment and, as illustrated in the sections that follow, in the 
employment trends for each type of non-standard work across countries.
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Decline in full‑time, permanent employees
Figure 10 differentiates between recent employment growth for ‘core’ workers – employees with 
full-time, permanent status – and ‘atypical’ workers – those who work part time or on temporary 
contracts or who are self-employed. Atypical employment has increased in four of the five quintiles, 
with significant growth recorded in the top and the bottom quintiles (of around 500,000 jobs in each). 
Core employment, on the other hand, has increased only in the top quintile – where it accounts for 
around 70% of growth – but has been destroyed in all other quintiles and has declined overall in 
absolute terms.
Figure 10: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and employment status, 
EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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So the process of destandardisation has affected different segments of the wage distribution differently. 
There is evidence that full-time, permanent employees have been replaced by non-standard or 
atypical workers, especially in low-paid but also in mid-paid jobs, and the traditional ‘standard’ 
employment relationship is increasingly the privilege of those in well-paid jobs. The countries 
in which the non-standard share of employment has been growing fastest include the four most 
populous Member States – France, Germany, Italy and the UK – as well as Austria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic and the Netherlands. As Figure 11 confirms, there is no single template for this 
destandardisation.
The figure breaks down non-standard work into its main component categories, including combined 
categories such as part-time self-employed and part-time temporary. In the UK, the main component 
of growth in non-standard work has been in self-employment – both full time and part time – and has 
been skewed towards the top quintiles. In the Czech Republic, full-time, temporary work accounts for 
significant growth across the quintiles, with self-employment also accounting for much top-quintile 
growth. In Germany, the growth of lower-paid part-time work has been the most obvious feature, 
although the explanation for this appears not to lie in the growth of ‘mini-jobs’ and ‘euro jobs’ 
introduced by the Hartz reforms a decade ago. Recent German data indicates that employment of 
those working exclusively in mini-jobs and those in euro jobs has been in decline since 2011 (IZA, 
undated). Part-time work in Germany appears, therefore, to be growing independently of (this) labour 
market policy and almost exclusively among women. The country now accounts for a quarter of 
part-time workers in the EU.
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Figure 11: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile in non‑standard forms of 
work, Germany, Czech Republic, the UK and the EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)
As the next section will discuss, the main factor behind the recent destandardisation of the 
employment relationship in the EU as a whole, as well as Germany in particular, has been the rise of 
part-time work. In 2014, it accounted for just less than 21% of all employment (up from 16% in 2002).
Rapid increase in part‑time work
Part-time employment grew across the quintiles between 2011 Q2 and 2014 Q2 and accounted for 
2.3 million net new jobs. Meanwhile, full-time employment continued to decline in absolute numbers 
from 2009 through to late 2013. It was only in the 12 months from Q2 2013 to Q2 2014 that full-time 
employment began to record positive growth. Over the three-year period, it contracted by around 
1.7 million jobs. Part-time growth has been strongest in the lowest quintile (Figure 12). The three 
part-time jobs that grew most were those of sales workers in retail and cleaners and helpers in social 
work activities and services to buildings. But it also grew more-or-less evenly across jobs in the higher 
quintiles, which suggests some normalisation of part-time employment even in higher-paid jobs, as 
has been the case for teaching professionals and health professionals, for example.
Consistent with Figure 10, showing the split between standard and atypical employment, full-time 
employment grew only in the top quintile – where it accounted for the majority of growth – and 
declined in all four lower quintiles.
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Figure 12: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and full‑time and part‑time 
status, EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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The share of part-timers has increased especially sharply in Austria and Germany in recent years and 
also continued to grow in the Netherlands, where in 2014 the number of part-time workers actually 
overtook that of full-time workers for the first time. In countries where labour market performance 
has been weaker and the workforce overall has contracted since 2011 – such as Cyprus, Greece and 
Spain – there has, nonetheless, been positive growth in part-time employment. This has taken place 
more or less across the quintiles of the wage distribution in these countries but, in each case, has only 
partially compensated the much more substantial decline in full-time employment in the same jobs.
An emerging pattern since the recession has been the increasing share of male part-timers. Four 
out of five part-time workers in the EU are women, but the net increase in part-time employment in 
recent years has been much more evenly distributed by gender. Over a million new part-time male 
workers were added to the EU workforce between 2011 and 2014. There is also further evidence of 
a normalisation of part-time work with trend increases across the wage distribution.
Self‑employment growing at both ends of the wage distribution
The self-employed account for around 15% of overall employment, and this figure has tended 
to be stable in recent years. As Figure 13 indicates, self-employment contributes only modestly 
to overall employment shifts at aggregate EU level. This growth has been mainly in the top two 
quintiles and has taken place largely in professional occupations in education, health, legal and 
accounting services, and ICT. In the bottom quintile, the ongoing decline in agricultural employment 
has been compensated for by growth in personal services employment so that the two contrasting 
developments roughly even out.
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Figure 13: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and professional status, UK 
and EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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The UK is one of the Member States – along with Ireland, Lithuania and the Netherlands – where 
a disproportionately high share of new employment since 2011 has been among the self-employed. 
This growth has been relatively evenly spread across the wage distribution, with similar jobs benefiting 
at the top, as in the overall EU aggregate data – teaching professionals in education and business 
professionals in management consultancies – and at the bottom – cleaners and helpers and personal 
services workers. There has also been some growth in the middle quintiles as self-employment in the 
construction sector has begun to recover.
Stability in temporary employment
Fixed-term employment is especially sensitive to the business cycle. It tends to decrease more sharply 
than aggregate employment during periods of recession, as temporary employees are likely to be 
shed first. The corollary is that temporary employment rises faster as economies recover because 
employers are more likely to take on fresh recruits on a temporary basis initially, pending more secure 
prospects. Recent developments in Spain, which until recently had the highest share of temporary 
workers in the EU, are a vivid illustration of how sensitive temporary employment levels are to the 
business cycle.
Figure 14: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and temporary and 
permanent employment status, Spain, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Source: EU-LFS, SES (author’s calculations)
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In the unprecedented destruction of employment that has taken place in Spain since 2008, the 
sharpest declines were experienced in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis. However, 
as Figure 14 shows, employment continued to contract right up to mid-2013. Temporary employees 
bore the brunt of these losses. In 2011–2012, they accounted for the majority of job losses, even 
though fewer than one in three Spanish workers had a temporary contract at this time. Temporary 
employment losses abated somewhat in 2012–2013 and were the mainstay of employment recovery 
in 2013–2014, with increases across the quintiles.
In the EU as a  whole, during 2011 Q2–2014 Q2, temporary employment declined, albeit very 
marginally and with much variation across Member States (Figure 15). In Germany and Spain, 
there were significant declines in temporary employment for contrasting reasons. A tightening labour 
market in Germany is likely to have prompted employers to switch temporary positions to permanent 
status or to recruit more workers directly on a permanent basis, while in Spain the tail-end of 
a destructive recession has disproportionately affected its comparatively large share of temporary 
workers through the simple expedient of non-renewal.
Figure 15: Employment shifts (in thousands) by job‑wage quintile and temporary and 
permanent status, Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland and the EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
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Increasing fixed-term employment was observed in the Netherlands as well as in many central and 
eastern European Member States, including Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – 
now the Member State with the highest share of temporary workers at 28.4% (2014 Q2). At aggregate 
EU level, almost all employment growth in top-quintile, well-paid jobs was among those with 
a permanent contract.
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Summary
• Employment in the EU increased by around 1.8 million in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2. This is the largest 
year-on-year increase since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008. Nearly half of 
the increase in employment was accounted for by one Member State, the UK. There has also 
been positive employment growth in the Member States most affected by the global financial 
and euro zone crises. Employment grew in all of the four countries in EU–IMF–ECB assistance 
programmes, and employment levels grew by more in Spain than Germany over the 12-month 
period.
• The pattern of employment shifts has altered since the resumption of employment growth, 
with more net new employment in low-paid and mid-paid employment. Employment levels of 
those with non-tertiary qualifications have begun to rise again since 2013 Q2. The pattern of 
employment growth in the EU over the most recent three-year period (2011 Q2–2014 Q2) as 
well as the peak recession period before it (2008 Q2–2010 Q2) has been one of asymmetrical 
polarisation, with greater growth in the top quintile. The most recent pattern (2013 Q2–2014 Q2) 
is less easy to label but is more downward-skewed, mainly as a result of stronger growth in less 
knowledge-intensive services (such as personal services, retail, and hotels and restaurants).
• During 2011 Q2–2014 Q2, most countries exhibited one of three patterns of employment shift – 
polarising, upgrading or downgrading. Polarisation was observed in three of the four ‘programme’ 
countries – Cyprus, Greece and Ireland – as well as Estonia, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. The 
clearest examples of upgrading employment shifts were in Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Portugal and Sweden. The clearest examples of downgrading shifts were in Hungary, Italy and 
Slovakia, although Germany (2012–2014) also exhibited greater employment growth in the lower 
quintiles.
• Atypical employment, notably part-time work, has grown, while the levels of those in full-time 
work, and more specifically of the core workforce of full-time employees with a permanent 
contract, continues to decline – in relative and absolute terms. Growth in full-time, permanent 
employment is increasingly confined to top-quintile, well-paid jobs; in all other quintiles of the 
wage distribution it is decreasing.
• Educational upgrading has resulted in a sharp rise in workers with a third-level qualification 
and in a contraction in the share of those without such a credential. From 2008 to 2013, net 
employment growth occurred almost exclusively for those with degrees. Resumption of more 
customary levels of employment growth in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2 has, however, manifested itself in 
rising levels of employment for those with completed secondary education in each of the bottom 
four wage quintiles.
• The fastest-growing, large-employing jobs are well-paid, top-quintile service sector jobs, such 
as ICT professionals in computer programming, and business professionals in management 
consultancies. While services continue to account for most recent employment growth (more 
than 7 out of every 10 workers in the EU now work in services), there has been growth in 
manufacturing employment since 2013 Q2, both in mid-paid technician occupations and in 
well-paid managerial and administrative roles. The construction sector in Europe continues to 
shed employment, mainly in the lower quintiles of the wage distribution.
• The crisis destroyed male employment disproportionately, largely due to the sectors that were 
hardest hit. Most recent employment growth (in 2013 Q2–2014 Q2) has been more evenly 
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balanced by gender. The biggest difference from the previous two-year period is the recovery of 
male employment in low-paid and mid-paid jobs. Women continue to take up more of net new 
employment in well-paid jobs.
• The workforce is ageing faster than the general population. There is a strong age profile to shifts 
in all forms of employment, with all five-year age groups over 45 growing and all groups under 45 
contracting. The fastest-growing group is that of 65–69-year-olds, with self-employment particularly 
contributing to this increase. On the positive side, it is likely that transitions to self-employment 
are enabling many older workers to continue in active employment up to and beyond traditional 
retirement age. On a less positive note, levels of entrepreneurial self-employment, more common 
among younger and core-age workers, are in decline.
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Long-term trends in the employment 
structure in six European countries
2
Introduction
In the early 1970s, the structure of European economies and labour markets was very different 
from today. The post-war model of European capitalism was at its peak after three decades of 
very rapid economic growth and full employment. Manufacturing was still the dominant economic 
sector, even if it was no longer the sector with the largest proportion of employees (if it ever was). 
In most families, there was still a single male breadwinner, generally with full-time, permanent 
employment. Unemployment was extremely low in comparison to the following decades. Most of 
these features of 1970s European economies are gone after four decades of rapid structural change. 
In most countries, the pace of economic growth has slowed significantly. Full employment has 
been effectively abandoned as a goal of economic policy, being replaced by the control of inflation 
and macroeconomic stability; and, partly as a result, unemployment has increased significantly 
and remained relatively high, even in periods of economic growth. The service sector has replaced 
manufacturing as the dominant sector of the economy. The single-male-breadwinner model has 
declined and almost disappeared, while part-time and fixed-term employment have become much 
more prevalent than before.
How did the employment structure change as a result of these large-scale economic transformations? 
What kinds of jobs were created and destroyed as European economies deindustrialised? Did the 
abandonment of full employment lead to a decrease in the number of low-skilled jobs available? 
What kinds of jobs did women take up as they streamed into the labour market in this period? These 
are the kinds of questions that this chapter will address, reviewing and discussing more than four 
decades of change in the employment structures of six European countries: Germany, Ireland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
The analysis will use an approach very similar to that used in the previous chapter for examining 
recent developments in Europe, although some adaptations are needed in order to use older and 
less detailed data sources. The relative simplicity of the jobs-based approach (using the standardised 
classifications of occupation and sector to evaluate the net effect of job creation and destruction on the 
employment structure) allows for large-scale comparisons of structural change over time and space. 
The basic requirement is the existence of more-or-less standardised labour force surveys, which are 
available in most countries worldwide and have been available in many European countries since 
the 1970s. It is difficult to expand the analysis further back, although for some countries it might 
be possible to do this using different sources, such as census data (see Murphy and Oesch, 2014).
There are some precedents for using a similar approach for the study of long-term trends in the 
employment structure, although they focus on individual countries. The most important are the 
studies of Wright and Dwyer (2003) covering the US; Goos and Manning (2007), covering the 
UK; and Spitz-Oener (2006) covering Germany. Wright and Dwyer found a significant diversity 
of patterns between 1960 and the 2000s in the US, although with an underlying consistent trend: 
starting from an unambiguously upgrading pattern in the 1960s, each decade showed the structural 
change in employment shifting more towards a polarising pattern, which was clearest in the 1990s. 
For the UK, Goos and Manning looked at the period 1979–1999 as a whole, finding a pattern of 
polarisation in the long run (without discussing possible differences in the patterns of sub-periods, 
as done by Wright and Dwyer). Spitz-Oener carried out a long-term analysis of Germany between 
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1979 and 1999, with similar results as those of Goos and Manning (again without looking at possible 
changes in the patterns of structural change over time).
The five EU Member States covered in this chapter account for more than 40% of the EU population 
and represent the different European employment and welfare models (except for the Member States 
that have acceded since 2004, for which there is no long-term data). As far as is known, this is the 
widest coverage so far for a study of long-term trends of structural change in employment. The 
analysis has been carried out separately in each country using national data sources and national 
expertise, but applying the same methodology to four of the six countries (Germany, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK) and making some minor changes (to be discussed later) in the case of two (Ireland and 
Switzerland). Following the 2003 study by Wright and Dwyer, the analysis of change in employment 
structures over the four decades will be broken down into sub-periods linked to the business cycle 
whenever possible (although sometimes data limitations force a different breakdown). This enables 
the existence of variations in the patterns of structural change in different periods of recent economic 
history to be evaluated.
The next section describes the project on which this chapter is built and the methodology followed. 
This is followed by an outline of some contextual economic and demographic data on the period 
and countries covered, presenting a series of initial questions with respect to structural change 
that the subsequent sections will try to answer. The chapter then discusses the broad patterns of 
structural change in employment in the six countries covered and proceeds to break down these 
overall patterns by economic sector, evaluating the occupational implications of structural economic 
change. The gender dimension of these developments is examined, and the final section presents 
some conclusions and briefly discusses some policy implications.
Methodology
This chapter is a synthesis of analyses carried out by five national teams of researchers working in 
parallel in 2014, under the coordination of Eurofound and the University of Salamanca. The analyses 
of Ireland and Switzerland were carried out by collaborators outside these core teams; the results for 
these countries will be included in the discussion of overall patterns of structural change, but not in 
the subsequent discussion of the occupational implications of structural change.
Each national team worked with different (national) data sources, applying a common methodological 
approach but adapting it to their national specificities as necessary. This approach is essentially the 
same one used in the other two chapters of this report, and it can be briefly summarised in the 
following steps:
1.  For each country and period studied, each national team had to identify a source of data for 
employment levels (and other key demographic and economic variables, if possible) at the 
beginning and end of the period, and a source of data on wages for employees (which could 
be the same as the one used for employment or not). The full list of sources used can be found 
in Annex 6. A key requirement was that all these data sources used the same (or compatible) 
classifications of occupation and sector, so that they could be linked and analysed at the level 
of occupation-by-sector combinations (the ‘jobs’ of the jobs-based approach).
2.  For each period, the wage data was used to generate a ranking of jobs. Linking this wage ranking 
with the data on employment in the initial year of the period, the jobs were assigned to job-wage 
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quintiles, comprising five groups of jobs, each with 20% of total employment in the initial year 
of the period, and with the jobs ranked from low to high wages.
3.  The absolute and relative change in the size of each of those quintiles was then analysed for the 
period studied, and broken down by other variables such as gender.
When covering such a long period of time, it is important to break it down into a series of sub-periods. 
One methodological reason for this is the existence of breaks in the classifications. This method of 
analysis relies, to a large extent, on the consistency of occupational and sectoral classifications over 
time, and in the last four decades, such classifications have been subjected to several significant 
revisions that make them inconsistent. This can lead to misleading results, because the analysis 
is done by looking at the change in the number of people in specific occupational codes, and it 
is impossible to differentiate when the observed change results from reclassifications or from real 
structural change.
A related problem is the stability of relative wages over time: analysing four decades as a single period 
assumes that the wage ranking used in the beginning remains adequate for characterising jobs over 
the following four decades. Although there is some evidence on the stability of the wage rankings 
over shorter periods of around one decade (see the appendices to Wright and Dwyer, 2003), one 
cannot assume that they still fully apply four decades later. Relative wage positions do change over 
the long term.
Furthermore, to the extent that the patterns of structural change may change, it seems logical to 
break down the analysis into a series of distinct sub-periods. If there is a single dominant pattern of 
structural change, it will emerge from the analysis anyway; but the existence of diversity should not 
be precluded by merging all the patterns into a single picture.
However, the decision to break down the analysis into a number of sub-periods still leaves many 
questions. Do all countries use the same sub-periods? And what should define them? In a project 
like this, it is important to find a balance between consistency across countries (necessary for 
comparability) and flexibility for national adaptations (necessary for dealing with data constraints 
and national specificities). So rather than a common periodisation, common principles were agreed. 
First, the periods should, if possible, follow the economic cycle, differentiating episodes of economic 
growth and recession. The reason for this is that there is evidence that the business cycle matters 
for the patterns of structural change (Jaimovich and Siu, 2012; Eurofound, 2013). A secondary and 
inescapable reason for the periodisation is the existence of breaks in the classifications, which, as 
previously mentioned, can have very significant effects on results but unfortunately do not coincide 
across countries. A third reason, as already noted, was to avoid periods that were too long, so that 
differences in the patterns of structural change over time could be detected and to ensure that the 
wage rankings still applied to the economic structure.
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Table 3: Periods of analysis for the six countries studied
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Spain
Germany
Sweden
UK
Ireland
Switzerland
Table 3 shows the periodisation used for the analysis in the six countries covered in this study. Each 
line corresponds to a period of analysis (with the arrows marking the beginning and end years). 
In many cases, though not all (particularly, not in the shortest), each period uses a separate wage 
ranking to assign the jobs to quintiles. In all cases (even in the shortest periods), the quintiles were 
recalculated at the beginning of each period, so that in the first year shown, the quintiles are real 
quintiles, each holding 20% of employment ranked by wages at the job level. The charts in this 
chapter will show (absolute or relative) change in the number of workers in each of the quintiles for 
each period (the number of workers in the final year minus the number of workers in the initial year).
As Table 3 illustrates, the periodisation is very different in each country. In Spain, Germany and 
Sweden, the periods are reasonably (although not perfectly) aligned with the economic cycle (see 
Figure 16). In the UK, Ireland and Switzerland, it was not possible to make such an alignment 
because of data constraints, which means that in some cases the up and down episodes of the 
business cycle may be conflated in a single period. This is unfortunate but unavoidable. Still, the 
overall picture should be relatively robust, and, in any case, the mismatch between periods and the 
business cycle is not complete.
Table 3 also shows some breaks that are more-or-less generalised: most importantly, the one in 
the early to mid-1990s (which corresponds with a change in the NACE classification) and the one 
around 2008–2010 (another break in NACE). The countries with the earliest coverage are Sweden 
and Switzerland (starting in 1970), while Germany has the latest start (1984). It should be noted that 
there are some gaps in the coverage, indicated by non-adjacent lines (for instance, Spain between 
1993 and 1994). In most cases, such gaps result from changes in classification that make occupation 
or sector non-comparable between two years, so that one year of change has to be ignored in the 
analysis. However, such gaps are unlikely to have serious implications, since a single year of change 
is in most cases insignificant in the long run.
A final thing to note is that the periodisation of Ireland and Switzerland is slightly different from the 
rest: starting in 1970–1971, both countries have a very regular periodisation in 10-year periods (with 
the single exception of Ireland between 1991 and 1996). The data on the employment structure in 
these two cases comes from the census rather than labour force surveys, as in the other countries. 
This has the advantage of providing much larger samples and long-term broad comparability but the 
disadvantage of being less flexible in terms of periodisation (since a census is carried out only once 
every 10 years). Otherwise, the results are broadly comparable with those of the other countries.
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Contextual data and guiding questions
As has already been mentioned in the introduction, the last four decades have been a period of very 
significant structural change in the six countries covered in this study. Although there are important 
differences across countries, in general the 1970s marked a shift away from the Keynesian policies of 
full employment towards an emphasis on restraining inflation, keeping macroeconomic stability and 
reinforcing market mechanisms. The economy transformed from one dominated by manufacturing 
to one dominated by services. The period 1996–2013 was marked by increasing economic 
integration both within global markets and within European economic structures, culminating in the 
introduction of the euro at the turn of the century. Compared with the previous three decades, it was 
also a period of relatively slow productivity growth and persistently high levels of unemployment. 
With the exception of the late 1990s and early 2000s, perhaps, the policy debate about the European 
economy during the period has been dominated by gloomy concepts such as Eurosclerosis or, more 
recently, ‘secular stagnation’. A very significant (and much more positive) social development, with 
important implications for the purposes of this study, is the steady incorporation of women into the 
labour markets of Europe, to reach almost equal rates of participation by the end of the period.7
These broad trends have affected the small sample of six countries in this report quite differently. 
This is partly because they were in quite different stages of economic development at the beginning 
of the period, but also because their pace of change was quite different, although they broadly 
share some of the same underlying trends. And some differences persist in the structures of these 
economies. These differences are useful because they should show up in the later analysis of change 
in the jobs structure; so in order to guide this analysis, some basic contextual data for these countries 
will be presented first.
Economic growth, employment and productivity
The first thing to consider is the overall development in economic growth, employment and 
productivity, represented in Figures 16 and 17.8 These figures show very different developments 
across countries, especially in the second half of the period. Until the mid-1990s, most countries 
look similar, with largely stagnant employment levels and a slowly but steadily increasing GDP. But 
after the early to mid-1990s, there is a significant divergence: Germany and Switzerland remain on 
a similar trend, with near stagnation in employment and a small increase of GDP; Sweden and the 
UK show substantial growth in real GDP, although with no significant increase in employment levels 
(reflected in the massive growth in the simple measure of productivity as GDP per hour worked 
shown in Figure 17); and, finally, Ireland and Spain increase very significantly in both GDP and 
employment.
7 Another factor that often appears in the literature as an important driver of structural change in employment is the generalisation of the 
use of computers and the associated productivity revolution, which would have an effect on the employment structure to the extent that 
different jobs can be affected differently. (The most well-known argument is that jobs with more routine task content tend to be negatively 
affected; see Autor, 2010.) This would be important only in the second half of the period studied here, after the mid-1990s in particular. 
Before that period, even in the US there is very little evidence of any effect of computerisation on productivity (see Brynjolfsson, 1993; also 
Stiroh, 2002). Since this argument has already been discussed in detail for 1995–2007 (see Eurofound, 2014), it will not be discussed here.
8 Although it would be useful to have longer time periods for this contextual data, to compare the period under analysis with the rather 
different previous one, in most cases it was impossible to look back further because of a lack of data from before the 1970s (or the 1960s 
in a few cases).
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Figure 16: Employment and real GDP in six European countries, 1975–2013
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Figure 17 shows that Ireland and Spain in the 1990s are very different when productivity per worker 
is looked at, despite looking similar in terms of robust employment and GDP growth. Whereas 
Ireland managed to expand productivity rapidly despite its massive employment growth, productivity 
in Spain in the period of economic expansion between 1995 and 2007 was almost flat (so that growth 
was purely the result of adding more workers to the economy, with no gain in efficiency).
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Figure 17: Aggregate productivity in six European countries, 1975–2013
Note: Productivity is measured as real GDP per employee. 
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This diversity in broad economic developments may be quite useful for the later analysis. Are the 
different types of growth (quasi-stagnant, productivity-driven or employment-driven) associated with 
different patterns of change in the employment structure? It seems a plausible hypothesis that higher 
productivity growth would be linked more to structural upgrading, while stagnation could be linked 
with polarisation, and employment-intensive growth with downgrading. A final guiding question 
is related to the cyclical ups and downs in GDP and employment growth, which are most obvious 
in Ireland and Spain but which affect all countries. Are the periods of economic expansion and 
recession associated with different patterns of structural change?
Change in the sector composition of the economy
In terms of broad structural change, the trends were extremely similar in the six sample countries, 
as shown by Figure 18. In all countries, the service sector already dominated employment in 
1975, accounting for around 50%, while manufacturing employed between 20% and 40% of the 
workforce, and agriculture less than 10%, except in Ireland and Spain (which had still sizeable 
agricultural sectors). In all countries, there was a very significant decline in the share of employment 
in manufacturing, which at the end of the period employed between 10% and 20% of workers, while 
the service sector had expanded to an overwhelmingly dominant position, approaching 80% of total 
employment.
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Figure 18: Share of employment (%) in six European countries, by broad sectors, 1975–2013
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Although these overall trends are very similar, there are important differences in the details, which 
may be associated with significant differences in the patterns of structural change in employment. 
To see such differences more clearly, the charts have been rearranged in Figure 19 so that each one 
represents a sector and the lines represent countries (with two separate charts for each sector to 
facilitate the analysis). From this, it is clear that:
• as previously mentioned, Ireland and Spain started with a significantly larger agricultural sector, 
which declined to a level comparable with the other four countries over the period;
• the same two countries had a massively oversized construction sector in 2008, which collapsed 
very quickly to a more normal level (construction sector employment fluctuates the most in all 
countries, but the fluctuations in Ireland and Spain dwarfed all the others);
• Germany started with a  very large manufacturing sector, which declined but remained 
comparatively big;
• the UK, which started with a  relatively large manufacturing sector, experienced the fastest 
deindustrialisation process, ending with a service sector that accounted for more than 80% of 
employment.
The different economic sectors tend to be associated with particular positions in the employment 
structure, so these trends can result in different patterns of structural change. For instance, one might 
expect the late shift away from agriculture in Ireland and Spain to be associated with upgrading 
(since traditional agricultural employment tends to be low-paid). Since industrial occupations have 
often occupied middle positions in the employment structure, deindustrialisation could be linked to 
the hollowing out of the middle (so the deeper the deindustrialisation, the more polarisation is to be 
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expected). As for the overwhelming predominance of the service sector, it is so large that it is difficult 
to associate it with any particular position, so that its structural effect on employment seems more 
indeterminate.
Figure 19: Share of employment (%) in broad sectors, by country, 1975–2013
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Importance of public sector employment
At the turn of the century, public sector employment accounted for a sizeable proportion of total 
employment in the six countries discussed here: according to ILO estimates, the proportion ranged 
from 18% of employment in Spain to 38% in Sweden. Unfortunately, the authors do not have 
international long-term figures on the evolution of public sector employment, but national-level data 
compiled for this project show a significant increase over the period studied, at least in the first 
half. An indirect approximation is provided by Figure 20, which shows social spending as a share 
of GDP between 1960 and 2011. As can be seen, the biggest increase takes place in most countries 
from 1970 and peaks for most around 1990; the exceptions are Ireland and the UK, where it peaked 
in the 1980s. Social spending decreased or remained stable after the 1990s, except in Ireland and 
Spain, where it increased with the economic crisis, because of increasing unemployment and 
declining GDP. Public sector employment decreased even in those countries after the crisis, however 
(Vaughan-Whitehead, 2013). As was the case with other data presented, there are some country 
differences despite the common overall trends. The biggest increase in social spending took place 
in Sweden, which went from a mid-low to a very high level in this period, while Germany started 
high but hardly changed, except during reunification in the early 1990s. The decline began earlier in 
Ireland and the UK, although in the UK there was some expansion in the late 1990s; and Switzerland 
continued expanding social spending until the 2000s.
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Figure 20: Social spending (%) as a share of GDP in six European countries, 1960–2011
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To the extent that these trends are a reasonable approximation of the trends in public employment 
in the period, they suggest a significant expansion in the first half of the period and stagnation 
afterwards. How would these trends be reflected in the employment structure? What kinds of jobs 
were created by the state as an employer, not only in public administration but also in broader social 
services? Did those jobs contribute to structural upgrading, or did they expand the middle layers of 
employment? What happened when public sector employment stagnated?
Female labour force participation
The final key development for which some contextual figures are relevant is the near equalisation of 
labour force participation of men and women. This is one of the most significant social and economic 
transformations of the period being studied here, which alters not only the gender composition of 
the labour force but also the structure of demand for services by families. For instance, the massive 
incorporation of women into employment implies a boost in the demand for provision of household 
services that were traditionally performed by women outside the market (Dwyer, 2013). Figure 21 
gives an indication of the scale of the change: from a labour force participation rate of less than 50% 
in the early 1970s (with the exception of Sweden and the UK, which had rates slightly above this 
level), there is a steady generalised increase to around 70%; this starts later in Spain and Ireland, 
but they catch up quickly, especially Spain. The differences between countries are mostly in terms 
of the initial position (with Sweden and the UK having an initial advantage, and the rate of increase, 
with the latecomers experiencing faster growth). But the process ends in a significant convergence 
that shows few outliers. Perhaps the clearest divergence is the change of trend in Ireland with the 
economic crisis, in contrast to Spain.
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Figure 21: Female labour force participation rate (%), 1963–2013
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Figure 22 provides a clearer illustration of the significance of this development, showing female 
labour force participation rate as a proportion of the male participation rate (in other words, the 
extent of gender inequality in this respect). Female participation started at around 60% of male 
participation in Sweden and UK in the late 1960s, below 40% in Ireland and Spain, and somewhere 
in-between in Germany. In Sweden, it rapidly increased to nearly 100% in the mid-1980s, where 
it has remained since. In Germany, Switzerland and the UK, it increased more slowly but steadily 
until it approached 90%, according to the most recent figures. And in Ireland and Spain, it hardly 
moved at all until the early 1980s, when it increased rapidly, so that they have caught up with 
other European countries in the most recent figures, approaching 90% in the case of Spain, while 
stagnating somewhat at 80% in Ireland.9
Figure 22: Female labour force participation rate (%) as a share of the male rate
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Is this massive expansion of female employment linked to particular patterns of structural change? 
This may suggest that transformations of the employment structure have been driven by labour 
9 An important qualification to this development is the fact that a significant proportion of women work part time in all of these countries, 
which, to some extent, facilitates their work–life balance, but which can also both reflect and contribute to a still-disadvantaged employment 
situation.
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supply, with the new abundance of female workers feeding the expansion of some typically female 
occupations. And demand for these occupations in many cases would simultaneously increase 
because of the increased participation of women in employment and their need to buy in the market 
services that they were previously providing domestically (Oesch, 2013; Dwyer 2013). But, in any 
case, in the presence of such large-scale transformations of the composition of employment, it is 
very useful to document and compare what kinds of positions the new entrants have taken in the 
employment structure.
Patterns of upgrading and polarisation over four decades
Having set out the broad structural trends in the six economies under discussion, one can use the 
jobs-based approach to try to evaluate how these trends translated into the employment structure. 
A recap on this approach may be useful to begin with, to describe the type of representation of 
change in the employment structure that is used in this section and the next.
Figure 23 shows the quintile picture of change in the jobs structure for the period 1977–1985 in 
Spain. Each bar represents absolute change (in thousands) in the total number of people employed 
in one quintile, ranked by job-wage, between 1977 and 1985. The lowest-paid jobs, accounting for 
20% of employment in 1977, declined very significantly (by 600,000 workers), the three middle 
quintiles also decreased noticeably but not so much (by around 400,000 workers), while the top 
quintile (comprising the 20% of employment with highest average wages at the job level) increased 
slightly (by 41,000 workers).
Overall, this was a period of intense job destruction (with a total decline in employment of more 
than 1.5 million jobs), but the pattern of structural change is one of significant upgrading, because 
the destruction was strongly biased downwards (in fact, there was some net job creation at the very 
top). Going back to the contextual information and guiding questions of the previous section, this 
‘negative upgrading’ in the jobs structure was associated with a period of intense productivity growth 
and structural change in Spain (with negative employment growth but expanding GDP figures, as 
a result of intense restructuring). Public sector employment expanded significantly, which, as will 
be seen, explains the small expansion at the top, and there was, as yet, no major increase in female 
employment (which started growing after this period).
Figure 23: Absolute change (in thousands) in job‑wage quintiles, Spain, 1977–1985
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Figure 23 is just an illustration of change in the jobs structure for a single country in a short period. In 
Figure 24, the same kind of representation can be seen for the six countries and four decades covered 
in this study. This figure includes many quintile charts for different short periods of structural change, 
located within a bigger scheme that represents the different countries (on the horizontal axis) and time 
(on the vertical axis). Each individual quintile chart is located where it corresponds approximately in 
European Jobs Monitor 2015 
44
the timeline: when the chart corresponds to a longer time period, arrows have been drawn on either 
side to represent the beginning and end years it covers. The representation of quintiles shown in 
Figure 23 has been embedded with the representation of countries and time coverage shown much 
earlier in Table 3. This way, developments across countries can be compared for the same period of 
time (along the vertical axis) and for the same countries over time (along the horizontal axis).
In Figure 24, the vertical axis of each quintile chart represents absolute change over each indicated 
period (in thousands), with the size of the axis being rescaled in each quintile chart. This is useful for 
identifying differences in the patterns of structural change across time, but can be misleading because 
the periods are rather heterogeneous (in shorter time periods, the extent of absolute accumulated 
change is likely to be smaller). Figure 25 shows an alternative representation in which change is 
rescaled to an annual average (simply dividing absolute change over each period by the number of 
years in the period), and all charts for the same countries are forced to have exactly the same vertical 
axis. This representation is more adequate for evaluating the intensity of change across different 
periods, independently of their duration.10
10 In Annex 7, there are two further alternative presentations of these results: one in which overall change in each period is represented in relative 
rather than absolute terms and one in which relative change is represented as an annual average (with a similar logic as Figure 25). These charts 
are useful for comparing the scale of change across countries, but have not been included in the main body of the report for reasons of space.
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Figure 24: Absolute change (in thousands) in job‑wage quintiles in six countries, 1970–2014
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Figure 25: Average annual absolute change (in thousands) in job‑wage quintiles in six countries, 
1970–2014
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Figures 24 and 25 illustrate a number of points.
• In general terms, there seems to be more diversity across countries than across time, at least in 
terms of the broad similarity of the results to the archetypal patterns of upgrading and polarisation 
(which remain dominant, as has been consistently found in previous research). With some 
exceptions, each country seems to be predominantly associated with a variant of either upgrading 
or polarisation across the whole period. Germany and the UK show a predominantly polarising 
pattern of occupational change, whereas Spain and Sweden (and to a  lesser extent Ireland 
and Switzerland) show a more-or-less consistent upgrading. Still, as also observed in previous 
research, upgrading remains the most pervasive pattern. In other words, the top of the job-quality 
structure tended to grow (in relative terms) quite consistently across countries over the whole 
period, whereas most of the diversity across countries and time is concentrated in the middle 
and bottom. It should also be noted that there is an almost complete absence of any pattern of 
structural downgrading (a relative expansion of the lower layers of employment), with the partial 
exception of Germany in 1990–1991 (which reflects the expansion of low-paid occupational 
levels following reunification) and to a lesser extent in 1998–2001 (with a downwards-biased 
polarisation).
• There is, of course, some variation within the countries themselves across the four decades 
covered. Perhaps the country with most variation across time is Spain, which experienced 
a radical process of economic restructuring first and a massive boom-and-bust cycle after the 
mid-1990s. Spain is where the periodisation most closely follows the cycles, and it uncovers 
quite significant differences in the boom-and-bust episodes: the periods of recession of the early 
1990s and 2008 onwards were intensely polarising, in sharp contrast to a generalised trend of 
upgrading in the periods of economic expansion (even in the intense restructuring period of 
1977–1985, in which there was a large reduction of employment). There is significant variation 
also in the UK, with alternating patterns of polarisation in 1975–1984, upgrading in 1985–1990, 
a strongly upwards-biased polarisation in the 1990s and 2000s, and upgrading in the recovery 
after 2010. Germany and Sweden show rather consistent patterns of polarisation and upgrading 
over time. Ireland and Switzerland show a consistent upgrading except in the 1980s, where both 
experienced some form of polarisation.
• Linking these results with the guiding questions of the previous section, one can say that periods 
of faster productivity growth seemed to be associated with processes of occupational upgrading, 
irrespective of whether such productivity growth occurred with employment expansion, stagnation 
or decline. Sweden is a very good example of this, with a high degree of consistency between fast 
productivity growth and occupational upgrading and hardly any change in overall employment. 
Job upgrading in Sweden was a shift of aggregate employment from the bottom to the top, with 
an absolute decline of the former and an absolute increase of the latter. The periods of fast 
productivity growth in Ireland and the UK after the 1990s are also associated with big expansions 
of the top occupational layers, very strongly concentrated in the fifth quintile in the UK and 
more spread across the top three quintiles in Ireland. Overall employment grew very little in 
the UK, while employment in Ireland expanded massively. The comparative stagnation of real 
GDP and employment in Germany over the period is linked to the strikingly consistent pattern 
of polarisation that has already been mentioned: in general, polarisation seems more likely in 
periods of slow growth, stagnation or recession (see also the cases of Ireland and the UK in the 
1980s and the Spanish recessions) than in periods of fast growth in employment or GDP. The 
strangely flat pattern of Spain in the expansion between 1994 and 2007 (with large expansions 
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of all but the second quintile)11 is associated with the similarly flat development of productivity 
over the same period, reinforcing this interpretation.
• And finally, Figures 24 and 25 may also, to some extent, support the argument of an association 
between the business cycle and the patterns of structural change, although not very strongly 
because of methodological limitations. As has already been mentioned, in Spain, where the 
analysis of structural employment change and the business cycle is better aligned, there is 
a seemingly clear link (recessions are polarising and expansions are upgrading). In the other 
countries, the differences do not seem so clear, but the worse alignment between the analysis 
and the business cycle may preclude finding any such cyclical variation, so it can certainly not 
be rejected.
Structural transformation of the economy and shifts in occupational structure
As has been repeatedly argued here, the key structural change of European economies in the period 
studied was a slow but steady deindustrialisation and the converse increasing dominance of services. 
This section will discuss the occupational implications of such trends. But there must be some 
caveats: because different countries are being covered over a long period of time, and the underlying 
sector classifications are inconsistent except in broad terms, the breakdown analysis is necessarily 
very rough and only broadly consistent across countries and time. Nevertheless, it should be possible 
to get a reasonable picture of the overall trends.
Figure 26 shows a breakdown of the patterns previously discussed by broad economic sectors in 
Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In this case, each quintile bar (representing average annual 
absolute change and therefore corresponding to Figure 25 above) has been broken down into a series 
of stacked bars corresponding to the different sectors. Examining these charts suggests the following 
points.
• The process of deindustrialisation had a generally negative polarising effect on the employment 
structure of the countries analysed, destroying employment in the middle layers of the occupational 
structure quite consistently throughout the period in most cases, an effect that is particularly 
obvious in (but not restricted to) recessions. Of course, there are significant country specificities. 
In Spain, the secular decline of low-tech manufacturing in particular had a negative contribution 
to upgrading in the earliest period (destroying employment in low-paid jobs), a  stagnant 
behaviour in expansions and a  negative polarising effect in the later recessions. High-tech 
manufacturing behaved in a more cyclical way, destroying employment in the fourth and fifth 
quintiles in recessions and creating it in expansions. Similarly, in the UK, deindustrialisation 
contributed (negatively) to upgrading before the 1990s and to polarisation later (especially 
high-tech manufacturing). In Germany, manufacturing was more-or-less stagnant in expansions 
(except a surprising expansion in the earliest period) and polarising in recessions. In Sweden, 
a consistent decline in manufacturing after 1975 contributed negatively to upgrading until 1996 
(destroying low-paid jobs) and to polarisation after 2003 (destroying mid-paid jobs).
11 The strange gap in the second quintile of Spain in this period is partly a methodological artefact. Although the method is generally robust 
when there are small changes, in some cases the position of a big job between quintiles may be somewhat indeterminate (if it is just around 
the boundaries between two quintiles, it may be difficult to decide in which one to locate it), which may lead to some inconsistency in the 
output. The case of Spain between 1994 and 2007 is probably the clearest case of this problem: if the quintiles are constructed on the basis of 
employment in 2000 rather than 1994 (which in most other cases does not make much difference), the gap in the second quintile disappears, 
and the overall pattern is one of relatively flat expansion of employment across quintiles, although with some upgrading. The authors feel 
that that would probably be the most adequate representation of structural employment change in Spain in that period, but for reasons of 
consistency with respect to the methodology applied in the other countries, the results have been left as they are in Figures 24 and 25.
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• The expansion of services, which accounted for nearly all employment growth in all countries 
and periods, tended to be more upgrading than polarising, with some exceptions. In Spain and 
the UK, where services are broken down by their knowledge intensity (following the Eurostat 
classification – see Felix (2006) for more details), knowledge-intensive services were consistently 
positive and upgrading throughout the whole period, whereas less knowledge-intensive services 
were more likely to expand at the bottom. In Sweden, services contributed strongly to upgrading in 
most cases, with some exceptions (the expansion of mid-paid service jobs between 1970 and 1975, 
and the more surprising expansion of low-paid service jobs in 2003–2007). The main exception 
to this overall pattern was Germany, where services (not broken down by knowledge intensity) 
contributed positively to polarisation in most periods, but especially in expansions (while in the 
2011–2014 recession, polarisation was driven by employment destruction in manufacturing).
• Two peculiarities related to Spain are uncovered by the more detailed sectoral breakdown 
available in this country. First is the strong cyclical effect of construction on the existence of 
polarisation or not: in the expansions, it contributed significantly to the expansion of mid-paid 
jobs; while in recessions – especially after 2008 – it contributed very strongly to the destruction 
of the same type of jobs. Second is the negatively upgrading effect of the late reduction of the 
agricultural sector (associated with a significant destruction of low-paid jobs in the first half of 
the period, until the early 1990s).
Figure 26: Average annual absolute change (in thousands) in job‑wage quintiles in four 
countries by broad economic sectors,1970–2014
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Of particular relevance in terms of long-term structural trends is the evolution of public sector 
employment, as argued previously. Unfortunately, a consistent breakdown by public and private 
employment is available in only three of the four countries – Spain, Sweden and the UK – but it 
shows some interesting results (Figure 27). In these three countries, public sector employment plays 
a very significant role for the overall development of occupational change.
• The biggest contribution is in Sweden, accounting for most employment growth in the first half 
of the period (1970–1990), and driving up the expansion of the upper two quintiles, in particular 
(with the exception of the period 1970–1975, where there was an expansion of public employment 
in the second lowest quintile). In the first half of the1990s, this process was drastically reversed 
with a very large destruction of public sector employment, but this also had an upgrading effect 
since most of the jobs destroyed were in the first and third quintiles. Between 1997 and 2002, 
public employment expanded again but much more modestly, with private sector employment 
driving the continuing process of upgrading. And, interestingly, in the final period covered in this 
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Figure 27: Average annual absolute change (in thousands) in job‑wage quintiles in three 
countries, according to public or private sector, 1970–2014
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study, there were significant shifts in public sector employment from the lower to the upper half 
of the employment structure, with only a limited net impact on overall employment.
• In Spain, the contribution of public sector employment is more modest, but equally consistent 
and upgrading throughout the whole period. Before 1994, most of the expansion of the highest 
quintile took place in the public sector, while a sizeable proportion of the jobs created in the three 
upper quintiles between 1994 and 2007 were public. Even in the first two years of recession, 
when the private sector was haemorrhaging jobs, the public sector continued having a positive 
upgrading impact. This makes the reversal of the trend in the second (austerity-driven) period 
of the recession more significant since, for the first time in recent Spanish economic history, the 
public sector contributed negatively to employment and with a downgrading effect (destroying 
jobs in the top three quintiles).
• Finally, the contribution of the public sector in the UK was also quite significant, but not as consistently 
upgrading as in the other two countries. In the 1980s, public employment had only a very modest 
but a clearly upgrading impact on overall employment trends. But after that moment, new public 
sector jobs were as often low-paid as high-paid jobs, with a surprising and significant polarising effect 
between 1990 and 2010, and a (positive) downgrading effect in the latest period of 2011–2014.
The contribution of the public sector to the observed patterns of structural change seems quite 
significant, especially since it is rarely discussed in the literature. The debate on the driving forces 
behind upgrading and polarisation tends to focus on the effect of primarily market forces such as 
technical change and international trade, which do not seem to apply much to the public sector and 
yet the role played by the public sector is crucial for understanding overall developments, as has just 
been seen.
Progress towards gender equality
The very significant progress towards gender equality in labour force participation is surely one of 
the most unambiguously positive socioeconomic developments in Europe in the last 40 years. But 
it would have been seriously circumscribed if the incorporation of women had been limited to the 
lower layers of the employment structure. At least from an occupational perspective, the results show 
that this was not the case (see Figure 28). In general terms, female employment expanded at least as 
much as male employment in the top job-quality quintiles (and in many cases, significantly more), 
both in absolute and relative terms, and very consistently over time. In fact, there was very little 
expansion in the presence of women in the lowest quintiles in Spain, Sweden and the UK (with the 
exception of Spain during 1994–2007, Sweden during 2002–2007 and the UK during 1990–2004). 
The country that stands out against the rest in this respect is Germany, where there was a very 
significant expansion of female employment in the two lowest quintiles in three of the periods (in all 
the polarising ones), even bigger than in the upper quintiles.
The evolution of male employment, on the other hand, was not so positive, and not only relative to 
female employment (after all, a process of equalisation necessarily means a relative decline in the 
position of the previously more privileged social category), but also in absolute terms. Figure 28 
shows many instances of absolute decline in male employment, which is clearest in recessions (for 
instance, Spain in the early 1990s or in the Great Recession, Germany between 1992 and 2001 or 
after 2008, or Sweden in the early 1990s). Such decline is often, though not always, concentrated in 
the middle layers of employment (except in Sweden, where it tends to be concentrated at the bottom).
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Figure 28: Average annual absolute change (in thousands) in job‑wage quintiles in four 
countries according to gender, 1970–2014
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These gender differences in occupational developments are consistent with previous research that 
uses a similar methodology but covers shorter periods (Grimshaw and Figuereido, 2012). It reflects, 
to some extent, the different occupational profiles by gender, but also an interesting link between 
gender and the structural developments discussed in the previous section. The secular decline in 
manufacturing and the increasing predominance of services, in particular the expansion of public 
and social services, are also linked to the long-term decline of the male-breadwinner model and the 
massive incorporation of women into the labour force. And in terms of the occupational structure, 
it is also associated with the relative expansion of the upper job-wage quintiles, a development that 
mostly benefited women in general terms, while the processes of polarisation in recessions tended 
to affect mostly men.12
Conclusions
This chapter has presented a new study of long-term changes in the occupational structure of six 
European countries, using new data compiled and analysed at the national level. This is probably 
the study with the widest comparative coverage using a jobs-based approach to discuss long-term 
structural change, which puts some of this report’s previous results in a different light and allows the 
discussion to be brought to a higher level of generality.
Perhaps the most striking result of this study is that, although there was a significant diversity in the 
patterns of occupational change over time, there was even more diversity across countries. In other 
words, particular countries seemed to be associated with particular patterns of structural change, 
with few exceptions. Germany, especially, but also the UK seemed to be consistently associated 
with a pattern of polarisation, in which the top and bottom of the occupational structure (with jobs 
ranked by their average wages) grow relative to the middle. This is consistent with previous research 
for those two countries (Goos and Manning, 2006; Spitz-Oener, 2006). In fact, this study’s approach 
shows that, even when the full period of the last four decades is broken down into a number of 
sub-periods, with the counter set to zero in the beginning of each one, the polarising pattern emerges 
with surprising consistency. A similar consistency was found in Spain and Sweden, although here it 
is associated with a pattern of occupational upgrading, and to some extent this is also the case in 
Ireland and Switzerland.
This relative consistency in the patterns of structural change within each country contrasts with 
the results of Wright and Dwyer for the US (2003). These authors found that since the 1960s the 
patterns of structural change in employment in the US went from outright upgrading to unambiguous 
polarisation, decade after decade. Why would there be more consistency in this report’s small sample 
of European countries? Why was there a clear predominant pattern in each country, with just a few 
exceptions? The consistency in the patterns of occupational change over time seem to suggest some 
degree of path dependency, perhaps linked to economic specialisation (which seems plausible in 
the case of the high-productivity, export-oriented Sweden) but perhaps, more importantly, to the 
relevance of national employment regimes also in terms of the patterns of occupational change. 
In this sense, perhaps the shift in the patterns of structural change in recent decades in the US 
suggests a significant change in the employment regime, whereas the higher consistency in this 
report’s sample of European countries may simply reflect more consistency in the period covered.
12 It is important to bear in mind that the expansion of the number of women in the higher-paid occupational levels does not necessarily mean 
an expansion of the number of women with higher wages. Women can join high-paid occupations but with lower pay levels, which would 
be associated to an expansion of inequality in wages within jobs. Still, it is important to document the fact that the expansion of female 
employment is not generally biased towards lower-paid occupational categories, but rather the opposite.
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It is important to emphasise that the differences in the dominant patterns of occupational change 
in the six European countries took place against the background of very similar broad trends of 
structural economic change. The analysis focused on three particular vectors of structural change: 
deindustrialisation and the overwhelming dominance of services, the increase of public sector 
employment, and the feminisation of the labour market. And, although there are some differences in 
the details, starting points and timing of such transformations, they were broadly extremely similar in 
all six countries, and yet they were associated with very different outcomes in terms of the changing 
occupational structure. Of these underlying vectors of change, perhaps deindustrialisation was the 
most universal in its occupational effects: in most cases, it resulted in a slow but steady contraction 
of the middle layers of employment, which was generally compensated for by much more significant 
shifts in other sectors that had more diverse results. The expansion of public sector employment, 
for instance, was generally linked to the growth of relatively high-paid occupations, but in the UK it 
also expanded the bottom quintiles after 1990, contributing to polarisation. In general, employment 
in services grew everywhere and it tended to be upwards biased but in Germany and the UK it also 
contributed significantly to the expansion of the bottom, while the same process did not occur in 
Spain and Sweden. The very significant increase of female employment was generally very positive 
in its broad occupational outcomes except in Germany, where it was strongly associated with the 
expansion of the bottom quintiles.
Although there was much diversity across countries, some common trends should not be ignored. 
The clearest one is the relative expansion of the top of the employment structure, which, with very few 
exceptions, could be observed in all countries and throughout all the periods covered. Conversely, 
most of the observed variation was in the middle and, especially, in the bottom of the employment 
structure. What this suggests is that different factors may have affected different segments of the 
employment structure, with more-or-less universal factors being more prevalent at the top, and more 
country-specific factors having a bigger influence in the middle and bottom of the occupational 
structure.
One of the most popular explanations for the consistent expansion of the best-paid and 
highest-educated occupational layers across developed economies is skills-biased technical change, 
linked to computerisation and the ICT revolution. But, as happened in the US case, the timing does 
not fit very well: cases of upgrading and polarisation can both be observed before the 1990s, when 
computerisation would have already started to have a significant effect on productive structures. 
So there must be other factors at play. For instance, some evidence has been shown for the effect 
of the expansion of social services and public sector employment in the countries analysed, which, 
particularly in the first half of the period, had a very significant impact on overall employment and 
which contributed to upgrading everywhere – although it contributed to a lesser extent to polarisation 
in the UK after the 1990s.
Explaining the diversity in the employment developments of the lowest-paid jobs is even more 
important than explaining the similarity at the top, at least in terms of policy. Why did low-paid jobs 
grow in net terms in some countries but not so much in others? Since there is (still?) a significant 
amount of institutional variation across European labour markets, and since labour market 
institutions are particularly and often explicitly aimed at regulating the conditions of work of those 
at the bottom of employment structures, the authors have previously hinted at them as plausible 
factors underlying the observed European diversity in the patterns of occupational change. The 
results shown in this chapter also point in this direction, but they open new questions too. For 
instance, it was argued that the pattern of polarisation in Germany in 1995–2007 could be linked to 
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the deregulating labour market reforms introduced during this period, which were explicitly aimed 
at facilitating the creation of relatively low-paid jobs to reduce unemployment. But the pattern of 
polarisation in Germany seems to pre-date such reforms. Is it because there were similar reforms in 
the previous decade, or because there were other underlying factors that were even more important 
in the long run?
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Summary of results from the 
Global Jobs Project
3
Introduction
The analysis of employment shifts in the EU Member States using the jobs-based approach has been 
carried out by Eurofound since 2008; it is a natural next step to extend the analysis both historically 
and geographically. The previous chapter showed the long-term results from a jobs-based analysis 
of six European countries, where accessible, good-quality national data allowed developments from 
the 1970s and 1980s to be charted. This chapter reports the results of a similar analysis of various 
non-EU countries, although it generally covers shorter, more recent time frames. The data presented 
arise from a voluntary cooperation initiated by Eurofound in mid-2013 with researchers interested in 
applying the jobs-based approach to their own national data. The first results from this collaboration, 
known as the Global Jobs Project, are summarised here and cover draft contributions received from 
partners covering Australia, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US.13
Most of the analysis presented here relates to 1995 and after because data were more readily 
available. For Japan, however, the data went back three decades to 1982.
Context
There are some labour market trends common to all countries covered in this chapter, regardless 
of their stage of economic development. In each, there has been a continuous decline for many 
decades in the share of primary sector employment (in agriculture and the extractive industries) 
and – China excepted – also in secondary sector (manufacturing) employment. The corollary has 
been the expansion of tertiary, or service sector, employment, which accounts for two-thirds or more 
of employment in most developed countries. In China, the growing service sector has accounted for 
the largest share of employment among the three broad sectors since 2010–2011 (37% in 2013, up 
from 13% in 1980). Manufacturing has grown in China, but the service sector has grown faster.
The trend of rapidly declining agricultural employment continues in some developing countries, 
as it also does in some of the newer Member States such as Romania and Poland. This tends to 
contribute mechanically to employment upgrading as agricultural employment is concentrated in 
the lower quintiles of the wage distribution. So the rate of attrition of agricultural employment is 
an important determinant of employment shift patterns in a given period. As noted elsewhere, the 
decline of agricultural employment in Germany continued to contribute significantly to lower-quintile 
employment declines until the end of the 1990s (Oesch, 2013). In China, especially, but also 
Japan, Russia and South Korea, it is the principal locus of job destruction and one that is heavily 
concentrated in the bottom quintile.
The jobs lost in declining sectors – whether agriculture or manufacturing – end up being replaced by 
new jobs in expanding sectors, principally in services. In addition, population growth and increasing 
labour market participation have increased the overall stock of employment in most countries. 
Manufacturing drew labour to the cities from the less attractive alternative of agricultural toil; 
subsequently, the growth of services has absorbed the employment loss caused by deindustrialisation 
and created more good than bad jobs. These broad sectoral recompositions of employment have, 
to date, tended to have positive consequences for aggregate quality of employment (as proxied by 
wage). The growing body of recent research on employment polarisation in developed economies 
13 Contributions covering India and Brazil were not received in time to be included.
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suggests, however, that automatic employment upgrading can no longer be taken for granted. The 
debate is largely framed by empirical findings from analysis using variants of the jobs approach and 
centres on the extent to which employment is polarising in developed countries.
To date, there is no consensus that patterns of employment shift in the same country or region are 
stable over time. The pioneering work of Wright and Dwyer (2003) in the US illustrated that different 
periods of employment expansion in that country were marked by different patterns of employment 
shift, from more upgrading shifts in 1960s to more polarised shifts in the 1990s. Recent work by Autor 
makes a comparable observation based on US data during 1980–2007 (Autor, 2010). Upgrading 
shifts in the first decade make way for more polarised shifts in the 1990s, while the final period 
(1999–2007) can be characterised as downgrading, with relatively greater employment growth in jobs 
at the bottom of the wage distribution.
The European Jobs Monitor has observed a variation of patterns between upgrading and polarisation 
at the broad EU level in its work from 1995 to date (Eurofound 2008a, 2011, 2013, 2014). The 
pre-crisis employment expansion was primarily upgrading (but with some polarisation), while the 
crisis and post-crisis period has been more polarising (but with some upgrading). How might the 
consideration of employment developments in other major economies using the jobs approach help 
in understanding what is happening in EU labour markets? There are a number of reasons why this 
might cast some additional light.
• It could clarify whether structural employment change in countries at different levels of 
development reflect those in the EU and the US. To what extent are differing levels of development 
and rates of growth important variables in predicting the distribution of employment shifts? Is the 
hypothesis of skill-biased technological change applicable mainly to post-industrial economies 
where the ‘service transition’ is in a mature phase? Are there any other examples of downgrading 
employment shifts that might prefigure a departure from recent patterns that alternate between 
polarisation and upgrading?
• It could illustrate how changes in the global division of labour – notably in highly tradable 
sectors such as manufacturing – are affecting aggregate employment quality at national level. 
For example, the rise of China as a manufacturing superpower is likely to have accelerated 
pre-existing processes of deindustrialisation in developed economies.
• It could deepen understanding of the links between changes in labour market institutions and 
shifts in aggregate employment quality – in the countries covered, there are opposing processes 
of formalisation and regulation of employment on the one hand (particularly in developing 
countries) and of deregulation on the other hand (principally in advanced countries).
Methodology
All of the country reports summarised here feature an application of the ‘standard’ jobs approach 
using national wage and employment data, as set out in the methodological note in Chapter 1. In 
addition, a common template was agreed for the country analysis. Each report was structured along 
the following lines:
1.  a literature review: the debate on structural employment change and job and employment 
quality in the country;
2. the national context: the information necessary to understand the analysis and results;
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3. methodology: the data constraints and problems of applying the jobs approach;
4.  analysis using the common approach including aggregate data by quintile and, where 
possible, breakdowns by gender and broad sector.
In practice, there were differences in the detail of the approach across countries, some for reasons 
of sampling frame coverage, some because of difficulties in data access, and others because of the 
structure of employment in individual countries. As a consequence, some of the national reports were 
able to provide all of the information prescribed in the template (and more), while others were limited 
in some respects. Table 4 sets out details of the data sources, periodisation of the analysis, some 
detail concerning methodological deviations from the standard jobs approach and an indication of 
the broad employment shift patterns observed.
Table 4: Details of the jobs‑based analysis undertaken
  Period(s) covered Data source(s)
Departures from or 
refinements of common 
methodological 
approach
Other comments Main pattern observed
Australia
2001–2006
2006–2010
Employee Earnings, 
Benefits and Trade 
Union Membership 
survey (LFS-EEBTUM 
supplement) (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics)
Analysis excludes 
self-employed.
Non-trivial data access 
problems. Sector 
disaggregated only by 
public and private sector.
Upgrading
China 2005–2010
Random subsamples of 
2005 Population Sample 
Survey (National Bureau 
of Statistics, NBS) and 
2010 sixth Population 
Census survey
Different data sources 
for employment at 
beginning and end 
period. 
Quintile charts provided 
with and without sizeable 
agricultural sector. No 
gender breakdowns 
provided.
 ‘Primary 
upgrading’
Japan
1982–2002
2002–2012
Employment Status 
Survey (ESS)
Job-wage ranking based 
on inflation-corrected 
average of hourly wage 
at beginning and end 
year. 
Outputs also provided 
based on job-education 
rankings.
Qualified 
polarisation
Russia
2000–2008
2008–2012
Population Survey on 
Employment Issues 
(Federal State Statistics 
Service, Rosstat). Also 
OZPP 2007 (Survey on 
Earnings by Occupations) 
and RLMS (Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring 
survey)
Combining data 
sources to generate 
wage ranking due 
to differences in 
coverage of wage data 
sources. Some limited 
imputation of job-wage 
cells. 
Outputs using various 
wage and educational job 
rankings. 
Upgrading
South Korea
2001–2008
2008–2013
August supplement of 
Economically Active 
Population Survey 
(APS) (Korean National 
Statistical Office)
Merging of job cells 
with fewer than 10 
observations to ensure 
robustness of wage 
estimates. 
Additional analysis 
provided for 1993–2002 
using one-digit industrial 
and occupational data. 
Mainly 
upgrading
EU
1998–2007
2008–2010
2011–2014
EU-LFS, SES (Eurostat)
Combining data 
sources to generate 
wage ranking due 
to differences in 
coverage of wage data 
sources. Some limited 
imputation of job-wage 
cells.
EU23 for 1998–2007 (EU28 
excluding Bulgaria, Cyprus 
Poland and Romania), 
EU27 for 2008–2010 
(excluding Croatia), 
EU28 for 2011–2014.
Polarised 
upgrading
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  Period(s) covered Data source(s)
Departures from or 
refinements of common 
methodological 
approach
Other comments Main pattern observed
US
1995–2007
2007–2010
2010–2014
Current Population 
Survey (Bureau of Labour 
Statistics)
Job rankings based on 
median hourly wage 
for 1995–2014, with 
quintiles set in 1995 for 
each period. 
Preliminary headline 
results provided only.
Polarised 
upgrading
Source: Global Jobs Project national reports
The jobs approach has principally been carried out to date in developed labour markets with a very 
large share of employment in the formal economy. This is not the case in many developing countries. 
For example, the informal sector in India – primarily subsistence agriculture – accounts for over 
80% of adult employment. The size of the informal economy in many of the developing countries 
and the fact that official data collection often omits large but hard-to-reach rural populations from 
survey samples are an impediment to a simple application of the jobs approach. Comparability 
between countries is also affected by different time frames – an unfortunate necessity arising from 
the periodisation of the national data sources used, as well as classification breaks in the key 
occupational and sectoral variables.
In interpreting the different patterns across countries, one must be aware that business cycle 
developments were regionally distinctive. The global financial crisis, for example, affected all 
countries but with greater consequences for the US and the EU than for the BRICs and Asian 
economies. For the Asian economies, the financial crisis of 1997 was as important as the 2008 crisis 
(if not more) in its negative consequences for output and employment.
Nonetheless, in all countries covered in this chapter, an effort has been made to present 
a comprehensive picture of employment shifts using official data sources. The next section compares 
the headline results by job-wage quintile for each participating country and the EU in the chosen 
time periods. This is followed by an account of broad sector-level developments across the countries. 
A series of country notes then outlines some of the contextual features of the labour market in 
each of the countries covered. These are based almost exclusively on the country reports but 
with some additional supporting references based on desk research. Each country note features 
particular breakdowns of the headline jobs approach outlined in Table 4 in order to concentrate on 
country-specific developments of interest:
• regional variations in China;
• differences by contract or employment status in Japan and South Korea;
• by gender and full-time or part-time status in Australia;
• the employment performance of high-tech and more knowledge-intensive sectors in Russia and 
South Korea.
A brief concluding section summarises the main, necessarily tentative, conclusions.
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Main results
Aggregate level
The headline results from the different countries and periods show patterns that for the most part 
resemble those observed in previous applications of the jobs approach: upgrading and polarisation 
(see Figure 29).
The greatest relative employment growth in two-thirds of the periods covered (10 out of 15) occurred 
in well-paid, top-quintile jobs. The weakest employment growth was generally in the lower quintiles, 
although the more developed, lower-growth economies – the EU, Japan and the US – experienced 
the sharpest declines in mid-paid jobs, notably during recessionary periods. Overall, however, it is 
clear that employment shifts were positive in quality terms in all periods and more clearly so in the 
pure upgrading countries.
Unambiguous examples of upgrading employment shifts were evident in Australia and Russia, both 
resource-rich commodity-exporting countries that enjoyed high growth in the pre-crisis period and 
in the case of Australia, post-crisis too. South Korea, too, was predominantly upgrading although 
this was less clear-cut post-2008, with a sharp fall particularly in top-quintile employment growth.
The mature, developed economies of the EU, Japan and the US were characterised by more polarised 
growth but again skewed to upgrading; in other words, relatively greater growth in the top rather 
than the bottom of the wage distribution. A key feature was weak growth in mid-paid jobs, partly 
reflecting stagnation of manufacturing employment pre-crisis and sharp declines in the post-crisis 
period. Adding to these declines, there were also important contractions in construction employment 
in Japan after 2002 and the EU and the US after 2008. Both the construction and manufacturing 
sectors have a concentration of employment in mid-paid jobs in these countries. One thing that 
emerges starkly from the comparison is the sharp decline in mid-paid employment in both the EU 
and the US in the immediate post-crisis period. Between 2008 and 2010, jobs in low-mid-paid and 
mid-paid quintiles shed 2%–3% of employment per annum.
Subsequent employment (and output) growth has been notably stronger in the US compared to the 
EU, with employment growth across the wage distribution, but the qualitative nature of the shifts 
has remained similar in both – which this report calls ‘polarised upgrading’, where the key features 
are relatively fastest employment growth in well-paid jobs, employment resilience in low-paid jobs, 
and relatively weakest performance in mid-paid jobs.
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Figure 29: Employment shift patterns (absolute per annum) by job‑wage quintile in six 
countries and the EU
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China is exceptional in many ways. Firstly, the scale of employment shifts dwarfs those in the other 
countries featured. During 2005–2010, the Chinese workforce grew by more than 8 million workers 
each year, equivalent to EU27 growth for the entire period 2004–2013. The bottom two quintiles, 
made up almost exclusively of agricultural labourers, each contracted by over 5 million workers 
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each year. The national report authors refer to this pattern as ‘primary upgrading’, which captures 
one important dimension of these huge shifts – the movement of tens of millions of rural workers to 
the cities, with rapidly growing industrial infrastructure and somewhat better-paid jobs, akin to the 
industrial revolutions of earlier centuries.
Growth faltered in many of the economies covered from an earlier period of high growth to a more 
recent period of subdued growth. In the EU and the US, the great recession (2007/8–2010) was 
more clearly polarising than the period before or after the crisis. There are no comparable figures for 
the other countries for the same short peak-crisis period (2008–2010), but for the somewhat longer 
periods that are covered, there appears to have been only modest qualitative shifts in spite of slower 
growth. Only in South Korea can a shift over time be seen, but even here it is from one of clear 
upgrading to one of more qualified upgrading as growth slowed.
Table 5: Average real GDP growth per annum (%) in the periods under analysis, in six 
countries and the EU
EU 1998–2007 2008–2010 2011–2014
2.6 -0.6 0.5
USA 1995–2007 2007–2010 2010–2014
3.2 0.3 2.2
Russia 2000–2008 2008–2012  
7.0 1.9  
South Korea 2001–2008 2008–2013  
4.4 3.0  
Australia 2001–2006 2006–2010  
3.2 3.2  
Japan 1982–2002 2002–2012  
2.4 0.8  
China 2000–2005    
9.5    
Notes: 2014 EU data based on Eurostat estimate.
Sources: World Bank, Eurostat
In Russia, the rate of employment change (gross and net) declined, but the overall upgrading shape 
is very similar in 2008–2012 and 2001–2008, notwithstanding a sharp drop in annual GDP growth 
(5.1 percentage points). Interestingly, as growth slows after 2008, the pace both of job growth in the 
top quintile and job destruction in the bottom quintile slows. In Japan, again, the level of net job 
creation becomes negative in the more recent period (2002–2012), consequent on very weak growth 
(0.8% average per annum), but the main pattern of polarisation across the top four quintiles and job 
declines in the bottom quintile remains broadly similar.
Change in the pace of growth within a country appears, therefore, to have had a modest impact 
on the pattern of employment shift. The main differences observed are between the economies, 
primarily between those that are clearly upgrading (notably Australia, China and Russia) and those 
that have seen a hybrid polarised and upgrading pattern (including the EU and the US).
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Sectoral level
In four of the countries covered – China, Japan, Russia and South Korea – quintile employment shifts 
were broken down by broad sector (the Australian report distinguishes only in terms of public and 
private sector employment). Some common sectoral patterns emerge from the descriptive analysis.
1.  Declining employment in the agricultural sector is the main factor explaining negative 
growth in lowest‑paid jobs.
This is notably the case in China. The headline finding of primary upgrading here is based on 
massive destruction of agricultural employment (around 55 million jobs were lost between 2005 
and 2010). The sector also contracted in Japan, Russia and South Korea and, again, these declines 
accounted for the majority of employment losses in low-paid jobs. The rate of destruction, however, 
slowed markedly between the earlier and later periods in each of these three countries. In the EU and 
the US, the main shifts away from agricultural employment, at least at aggregated level, occurred in 
earlier periods and so are less evident in the quintile charts. In practice, this means that the bottom 
wage quintile – where most agricultural employment lies – has been more likely to register positive 
employment growth in the mature, developed economies.
2.  Manufacturing employment shifts occurred in different parts of the wage distribution in 
different countries. Levels grew strongly in China, modestly in South Korea but declined 
in Japan and, sharply, in Russia.
In China, manufacturing employment grew by over 31 million making it the biggest broad sector in 
terms of growth. These gains were largely recorded in the second quintile, in mid-high-paid jobs.
South Korea is also a  major exporting country, with a  highly developed and competitive 
manufacturing base and an increasing trade surplus concentrated in high-tech manufactured 
products. It has maintained this status and has a manufacturing employment share comparable to 
that of the EU (16.7% of total employment in 2013), which is contracting at a comparable rate (0.25 
percentage points per annum in 2001–2013 after much sharper falls – 0.8 percentage points per 
annum – in the preceding decade, 1991–2001). Employment shifts within manufacturing have been 
clearly upgrading, especially during 2001–2008, when the key feature was employment growth in 
the top quintile in low-technology-intensive industries and, especially, high-technology-intensive 
industries. Employment destruction in manufacturing has been largely confined to the mid-paid and 
mid-low-paid quintiles in low-tech industry.
In Japan and Russia, manufacturing employment declined, although these declines were mainly in 
the lower part of the wage distribution in Japan (the first and third quintiles) and in the upper part in 
Russia, where the sharpest declines were in mid-high-paid jobs. In both countries, there was positive 
employment growth in the top quintile in manufacturing, indicative of occupational upgrading in the 
broad sector (a higher share of management and professional jobs).
In the EU and the US, deindustrialisation has tended to destroy employment in the middle of the 
wage distribution, contributing to polarisation even if developments in the service sector have been 
numerically more important in this respect.
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3.  Construction sector employment was an important component of employment growth, 
especially in periods of higher growth and in countries with higher growth.
Construction added 17 million new jobs in China between 2005 and 2010. It grew also in Japan, 
Russia and South Korea but only in the earlier, higher-growth, periods covered. There was quite 
a variation across countries in how relatively well construction sector jobs were paid. In Japan, they 
were mid-paid jobs – as generally is the case in the EU as well – and in South Korea, they were 
concentrated in mid-high-paid jobs. In China, as a result of the compression of all non-agricultural 
employment into the top three quintiles, they were shared between the mid-paid and mid-high-paid 
quintiles. Most idiosyncratic of all, in Russia nearly all construction sector employment growth 
during the high-growth period (2000–2008) was in the top quintile. Workers in the sector enjoy 
‘additional pecuniary compensations for working in hazardous conditions or in unfriendly climate(s)’, 
according to the authors. Mining and transportation jobs, presumably for similar reasons, tend also 
to be in higher quintiles in Russia.
Because of its sensitivity to the business cycle, construction has tended to have a disproportionate 
impact on aggregate employment shifts in the short and, sometimes, medium terms. In the EU and 
the US, where work in the sector is predominantly in mid-paid jobs, rapid rises in construction 
sector employment during periods of employment expansion have tended to disguise underlying 
polarisation, while equally sharp declines during recessions have accentuated polarisation. It is likely 
that these effects were, in turn, exacerbated by financial deregulation and increasing flows of credit 
to the property sector.
4.  Strong private services employment growth mainly in less knowledge‑intensive services 
in China and Russia and in knowledge‑intensive services in other countries and the EU.
In China, the retail sector experienced the second largest rise in absolute employment of any broad 
sector (the largest having occurred in manufacturing). Around 22 million new jobs were created in 
2005–2010.
In Russia, too, this was a particularly fast-growing sector. Annual employment growth of the broad 
market services sector (about 600,000 net new jobs) was some three times higher than that in 
the public or non-market services sector, and four times the rate of destruction of manufacturing 
employment. This growth was mainly in well-paid jobs.
The primary factor driving Russian employment upgrading over the period was, according to the 
authors, ‘the structural shift from the production of tradable to non-tradable goods’. It was a period 
of accelerated transition to a service-based market economy from one with a comparatively low 
services base and which had only recently abandoned central planning. This was accompanied by 
a very rapid rise in real earnings (10%–15% per annum) and was supported by supply factors, such 
as a rapid expansion of tertiary education.
As the authors indicate, ‘different institutional foundations […] demand different occupations and 
skills and therefore ultimately affect the economy-wide composition of jobs [...]. The transformation 
radically increased and modified flows of information, and created a large and growing demand 
for workers who absorb and process all types of data [especially] white collar occupations such 
as managers, lawyers, accountants, journalists, economists.’ Demand for these skills had been 
‘extremely low under central planning and sharply jumped with the start of the transition’.
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The process of catch-up growth in the commercial or trading sectors continued throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, according to the authors of the Russian report, as appears also to have been the case in 
China. Increased retail employment was, in any case, a predictable consequence of higher growth, 
increasing prosperity and rising consumption in countries with fast-opening market economies.
In Japan and South Korea, employment growth was again concentrated in services, especially in 
the earlier higher-growth periods, but this tended to be quite dispersed across the wage distribution 
in both countries. Knowledge-intensive services have accounted for the overwhelming majority of 
top-quintile employment growth in the EU and the US.
5. Large cross‑country variation in public services employment
There were contrasting patterns in public services employment.
In South Korea, one of the main developments since 2001 has been the large expansion of primarily 
state-funded sectors. A large expansion of state welfare provision increased employment in education 
and public administration in 2001–2008 (especially in top-quintile jobs) and in the health and social 
work sectors after 2008 (mainly in the middle and bottom quintiles).
Growth in top-paying jobs in Japan was also attributable in large part to increases in public 
administration employment, especially in the earlier period. Health service employment has also 
grown strongly, unsurprisingly for a country with a rapidly ageing population. A significant difference 
from the EU is that health sector employment growth was heavily concentrated in relatively low-paid 
jobs; in the EU, it has been generally in mid-high-paid and high-paid jobs. This suggests that much 
of this net new employment has been in less skilled, personal care occupations.
One characteristic of public sector employment in Russia, noted by the country report authors, 
is that it is relatively low paid, accounting for 40% of bottom-quintile employment, for instance. 
Nonetheless, growing employment in non-market services, especially pre-2008, was concentrated in 
mid-high-paid jobs (fourth quintile), so public service employment tends to grow faster in higher-paid, 
higher-skilled roles.
Public sector employment in Australia is concentrated in the top two quintiles. While one in five 
employees works in the public sector, it accounts for over 40% of top-quintile, well-paid employment, 
over 30% in the fourth quintile with a monotonically decreasing share moving towards the bottom 
quintile (where it accounts for 6% or less, depending on period). Employment growth was more-or-less 
evenly distributed between public and private sectors as per starting shares in the earlier period, 
2001–2006. The second period (2006–2010), however, was marked by a sharp decline in the public 
sector share of employment across all quintiles. In absolute terms, public sector employment also 
declined (by 69,000 jobs), with the sharpest declines in mid-paid and mid-low-paid jobs. Only private 
sector employment grew in this period.
In China, the only public services sector to feature in the sector disaggregation – health and social 
welfare – contributed very modestly to overall employment growth.
In summary, behind some common trends – declining agricultural employment, increasing share of 
services employment and increases in aggregate employment quality – there are significant variations 
across the countries in the sectors that contributed most to net employment growth and destruction 
and where in the wage distribution these growing or declining jobs were most likely to be found.
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The next section looks more closely at some of the contextual and labour market institutional features 
in each country that may further clarify the headline patterns of employment change presented so 
far.
Country notes
China
The inclusion of China in this comparative analysis adds greatly to the interest of the project. It is the 
most populous country in the world, accounting for nearly one in five of the global population. It has 
transformed itself in a generation from a large, centrally planned, autarchic economy, mainly based 
on subsistence agriculture, to the industrial workshop of the world and its greatest goods exporter. 
This transformation has resulted in China becoming the second-biggest economy in the world, with 
an average annual growth rate of 10% over the last three decades. Living standards and longevity 
have risen largely in line with economic output. Real wages nearly doubled between 2001 and 2010 
but were still outpaced by productivity improvements.
This transformation was accompanied by a  rapid phase of urbanisation such that over half of 
the population now live in cities (up from around 20% in the pre-reform years of the 1970s). The 
integration of the Chinese workforce (around 760 million workers in 2013, nearly twice as many 
as the EU and the US combined) has been the main factor in the ‘great doubling’ (Freeman, 2008) 
of employment in the global market system. This has been marked by a huge expansion of the 
manufacturing sector but significantly also by an even faster rise in the service sector, both in output 
and employment. The tertiary sector accounted for 37% of employment in 2012, compared with 
31%–32% for the primary sector and for manufacturing and construction combined.
A transformation of this scale has ramifications, of course, well beyond Chinese borders. China 
accounted for 8.5% of all EU exports in 2013 and exports to China have been growing annually by 
16% in recent years. On the other hand, cost competition from low-cost countries, especially China, 
has resulted in a significant offshoring (direct and indirect) of manufacturing output and employment 
from developed to developing countries. The ratio of value of goods imports to exports from the EU 
to China, for example, is around 2:1, although this has contracted since 2008 because of a slowdown 
in Chinese imports and an increase in EU exports to China (European Commission, 2014).
The impact of the global financial crisis was mild on the Chinese economy compared to that in 
the EU and the US. A significant programme of economic stimulus in 2009–2010, accompanied by 
a policy more oriented towards domestic consumption, helped cushion the Chinese economy against 
the impacts of its heavy reliance on external trade. The sheer scale of the Chinese economy enables 
it to withstand global shocks. Annual growth has never fallen below 3% since the beginning of the 
modern transformation of China in the late 1970s. Even during the global financial crisis, annual 
growth declined from 14% to a still ‘tigerish’ 9% in 2009.
The growing contribution of China to global output growth is evident in Figure 30. The share picked 
up markedly after 2001 when China was admitted as a member of the World Trade Organisation.
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Figure 30: Contributions to global GDP growth (% per annum) from different countries and 
regions
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The authors of the Chinese report underline a number of potential obstacles to future Chinese 
economic growth.
• The ‘almost endless supply of rural labour’ that has fuelled the Chinese economic miracle is 
rapidly contracting. The authors indicate that ‘90% of the young rural workers that are less than 
30 years old are employed in non-agricultural sectors’. Additionally, as a result of the one-child 
policy, the population growth rate has moderated sharply from +15 per thousand annually in the 
early 1980s to +5 per thousand in 2014.
• As a result of declining supply and higher wages, the low-cost production model of Chinese 
manufacturing export faces cost challenges from other emerging economies. Declining cost 
differentials with developed economies are also undermining the rationale for offshoring from 
higher-GDP countries.
• There are increasing imbalances and inequalities within China: regionally, with the east growing 
faster than the west; socially, as a consequence of a rural–urban divide formalised in the hukou 
permanent resident registration system; and economically, in terms of increasing concentrations 
of wealth, reflected in a high Gini coefficient for income inequality (0.47 in 2012, somewhat 
higher than the US coefficient of 0.45 and much higher than the EU coefficient of 0.30). The 
report authors also identify a related problem of educational polarisation along the rural–urban 
divide.
While the Chinese employment structure analysis is based on a relatively short period (2005–2010), 
there is a strong likelihood that the main patterns identified reflect longer-term changes going back to 
the beginnings of the modernisation of the Chinese economy in the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–1992). 
While the level of employment growth has slowed somewhat in the last 10 years compared with 
1980–2004, the Chinese labour market still added around 40 million new jobs in 2005–2010. As 
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already discussed, this was the result of a massive reallocation of labour from the countryside to 
growing cities, and from agricultural employment to services and manufacturing employment.
Figure 31: Employment shifts by job‑wage quintile and region, China, 2005–2010
Note: Excludes agricultural employment
Source: China national report
An important finding relates to the regional variation in patterns of employment growth (see Figure 31, 
which excludes developments in the agricultural sector). As indicated, the Chinese economic miracle 
has been accompanied by a widening disparity in regional economic performance and wealth. The 
eastern provinces have urbanised faster, have benefited most from internal migration flows and 
have accounted for a much larger share of Chinese manufacturing growth than central or western 
provinces. GDP per head in the big cities of the east is approaching developed-world levels (above 
USD 13,000 in 2012 in the city regions of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) and is some four times the 
level recorded in the poorer western provinces. Developments in the employment structure reflect 
these differences. In absolute terms, also, the net gains in employment are heavily weighted towards 
the eastern provinces, which contributed 31.3 million of the total net national employment gain of 
39.1 million in 2005–2010. The eastern provinces also benefited disproportionately in terms of the 
growth of well-paid employment (in the top two quintiles). Behind these figures is what the authors 
describe as ‘the largest population migration in [...] human history’, urban employment having 
increased from 100 million in 1978 to around 380 million in 2014, much of this increase deriving 
from internal migration flows. The working-age migrants – notwithstanding the barriers of the hukou 
system – have been attracted by the prospect of more and better-paid jobs.
The regional variation in employment shifts is an indication that Akamatsu’s Flying Geese pattern14 of 
industrial upgrading may be replicating itself within China, in what the authors refer to as ‘sequential 
14 Identified by Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, this refers to a model of the international division of labour within Asia where a lead 
nation, in this case Japan, will draw other regional economies up the development ladder in its wake as increasing labour costs in the 
lead country necessitate transfer of labour-intensive activities to nearby countries. Developed originally in the 1930s, Akamatsu’s theory 
envisaged four tiers of Asian economies, with Japan the lead goose, South Korea, Taiwan and others in the second rank, and China in the 
rearguard. 
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upgrading’. According to this hypothesis, increasing labour costs in the eastern provinces will drive 
restructuring towards more capital-intensive, higher-productivity manufacturing and services, while 
more labour-intensive manufacturing will transfer to the central and western provinces. The relatively 
faster growth of higher-paid employment in the eastern provinces offers some support for this theory, 
although the national report does not include more detailed sectoral breakdowns of employment 
shifts at regional level that might serve as corroboration. What the authors stress is that a certain 
model of growth based on abundant labour reserves has run its course and that future growth will 
‘rely more on productivity improvement and [that...] economic restructuring and industrial upgrading 
will accelerate’. If this scenario plays out as anticipated, ‘employment opportunities will mainly be 
found in jobs at the high end of the value chain’.
Russia
The Russian labour market in the first decade of the new century represents a particularly interesting 
object of study for a jobs-based analysis. The period from Russia’s ‘second revolution’ in 1991 until 
the global financial crisis was one of wrenching transformation from a centrally planned to a more 
market-based economy, followed by rapid economic growth in the early mid-2000s.15 The ‘great 
contraction’ between 1991 and 1998 saw a 40% cumulative decline in GDP. In contrast, output 
almost doubled between 1999 and 2008. Real earnings rose in tandem as surging commodity 
exports laid the basis for an accelerated transformation of the employment and productive structures. 
The Russian national report covers the latter period and the years after the global financial crisis 
up to 2012. Even though this period featured strong growth, and change was less traumatic than 
in the immediate post-transition years, according to the authors there continued to be a ‘massive 
reallocation’ of employment across occupations and sectors. Declining employment in agriculture 
and manufacturing was more than compensated for by a sharp rise in services employment. Through 
the prism of job-wage quintiles, these employment shifts were unambiguously upgrading.
The authors of the Russian national report underline how unique the Russian post-transition 
adjustment was in many respects, even by comparison with Soviet satellite countries in eastern 
Europe. For example, employment destruction in the 1991–1998 period was much more limited in 
Russia. For each 3 percentage points of GDP decline, only 1 percentage point of employment was 
destroyed. The same elasticity was closer to one in the central and eastern European countries. Low 
wage floors and high levels of wage flexibility were two important employment buffers; earnings lost 
almost two-thirds of their real value during the post-transition slump.
To an extent, these buffers are also evident in Russian employment data after 2008. Net employment 
growth slowed (from an increase of 720,000 per annum average in 2000–2008 to an increase of 
230,000 in 2008–2012) but was on average positive over the four-year period despite, for example, 
a sharp fall of 7.8% in GDP in 2009 after the global financial crisis. One distinctive feature of the 
Russian data is that the pre-crisis employment expansion was ‘associated with the acceleration of 
economic restructuring while the crisis events of 2008–2009 caused [...] a deceleration’.
The upgrading of the employment structure in Russia was especially concentrated at the margins, 
with most of the net employment shifts occurring in either the bottom or the top quintiles. The gains 
in the top and the declines in the bottom quintiles were especially noteworthy in the earlier period, 
with average net employment gains in the top quintile, for example, just over 570,000. Thereafter, 
15 An extension of the analysis back to 1991 would be even more interesting, but no fully comparable labour force survey data were available 
for the pre-2000 period. 
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while the upgrading pattern persisted, the scale of gains and declines by quintile was much more 
modest. The middle three quintiles saw comparatively marginal changes in both periods.
The gender employment gap is narrow in Russia (51% of the workforce being men and 49% women in 
2012), but this legacy of the Soviet era emphasis on the equality of labour market participation is not 
reflected in wage levels (Atencio and Posadas, 2012). The gender pay gap is among the highest in the 
developed world. This has its counterpart in a skewed gender distribution of employment across the 
job-wage quintiles, with 70% of top-quintile employment being male, and female workers accounting 
for 56%–70% of employment in the bottom three quintiles.16 Male employment gains, especially in 
2000–2008, were concentrated in the top quintile, while female gains were distributed across the 
top four quintiles, albeit with an upward skew. Job destruction in low-paid, bottom-quintile jobs 
was more or less equally shared by gender. In the period of more modest employment growth post-
2008, the female share of top-quintile employment growth has increased but remains below 40%, 
much lower than in the EU where, over the same period, women have accounted for the majority of 
employment growth in well-paid jobs.17
So the picture in Russia was one of clear, unambiguous upgrading, persistent over both periods 
covered although somewhat stronger pre-crisis. The authors indicate some potential caveats to 
their empirical findings – the absence of migrant workers in the data source used for employment 
estimates and the likely inflation of wage estimates for some fast-growing jobs in the market services 
sector where the data used covered large and medium-sized firms only – but estimate that these 
would affect only the degree of upgrading and not its essential character.
Because of the specific historical circumstances of the post-transition Russian labour market in the 
1990s and 2000s, the national report authors argue that skill-biased organisational change probably 
played a more important role than skill-biased technological change as a driver of changes in the 
employment structure, notably the growth in well-paid jobs.
Figure 32 shows the modest contribution of high-tech services and negative contribution of high-tech 
manufacturing to employment growth. However, even in the top quintile, more net new employment 
was created in less knowledge-intensive services (retail in particular) and low/medium-low tech 
manufacturing.
16 The Russian national report authors also note that ‘Russian men have a positive gender earnings gap but a negative educational one’; in 
other words, women are over-represented in jobs with higher average qualification levels. Something similar is observed in the EU, but it 
is largely confined to the younger cohort; in Russia, it is observed over the whole age range, a further legacy of Soviet-era gender policies.
17 An important limitation of the jobs approach is that where individual jobs are ranked on the basis of median or mean hourly wage of all 
workers in the job, it is blind to intra-job variation of wages. For this reason, even where women account for the majority of employment 
growth in well-paid jobs, if they earn less on average than their male counterparts in the same job – as is mainly the case – there is no 
necessary impact in terms of narrowing the gender wage gap. 
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Figure 32: Annual average employment shifts in services and manufacturing by job‑wage 
quintile, Russia, 2000–2012
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Source: Russia national report
Rapid expansion of information technology skills and employment in the 2000s offers some 
support to a more conventional explanation of shifting patterns of employment in Russia based on 
skill-biased technological change. But this has to be juxtaposed with evidence that the technological 
and industrial infrastructure in Russia deteriorated post-transition, especially in the 1990s. This 
trend weakened but did not reverse during the high-growth 2000s. As the authors write, ‘the fact that 
the most technologically advanced industries employed little [sic] labour force also speaks against 
the SBTC [skill-biased technological change] hypothesis’. This is ironic, as the observed pattern 
of employment shift in Russia from 2000 to 2012 mimics the theoretical prediction of skill-biased 
technological change.
The authors conclude by outlining possible future developments in the Russian employment structure. 
They indicate that these are highly unlikely to repeat the positive patterns observed during 2000–
2012.18 Deteriorating demographics will see a decline in labour market participation and employment 
levels. The rate of human capital enhancement is likely to slow down and catch-up convergence with 
developed country shares of employment by occupation and industry is largely played out. Room for 
further positive, upgrading shifts is therefore limited.
South Korea
South Korea is one of the countries in which there are recent examples of jobs-based analyses 
of shifts in the employment structure. Employment polarisation emerged as an issue of policy 
interest in South Korea in the 2000s. This was prompted by studies showing possible labour market 
determinants of growing income inequality in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This 
crisis, more severe in its local impacts than the global financial crisis 10 years later, resulted in 
a sharp fall in GDP of 5.7% in 1998. There was a related concern that labour market flexibilisation, 
for example the deregulation and expansion of the temporary agency work system, was contributing 
to inequality.
The incidence of low-wage work in South Korea (25%) is among the highest of the OECD countries 
(and is the same as the US). The country is also among the highest in terms of earnings dispersion 
(OECD, 2013). Earlier work using a jobs-based approach with two-digit sector and occupational 
data found employment polarisation in 1993–2000 and, to a  lesser extent, in the later, shorter 
period 2000–2004 (Cheon, 2006). The analysis was, however, restricted to salaried employees only, 
18 It is worth adding that these predictions pre-date the huge drop in oil prices of late 2014 (oil and natural gas account for 68% of Russian 
exports) and the Ukrainian ongoing unrest that began in the same year. 
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excluding the sizeable self-employed population in South Korea. Later analysis using one-digit data 
observed top-skewed employment growth (upgrading) in 2000–2008, followed by greater relative 
growth in mid-paid jobs in 2008–2012 (Sung, 2014), more in line with the findings of the South 
Korean report for this project.
Self-employment contracted from 28.3% of total employment in 1998 to 22.5% in 2013, and much 
of this contraction is related to the decline of employment in the ‘shrinking small and pre-modern 
sector’, notably agriculture (Hwang, 2014). Nearly all of this decline occurred in jobs in the bottom 
two quintiles and so was intrinsically upgrading. Another contributor to the standardisation of the 
employment relationship in the South Korean labour market has been the declining share of non-paid 
family workers (from 10% to 5% of total employment over 1998–2013).
While the main pattern of employment change identified in the South Korean analysis was of 
upgrading, excluding self-employment leads to a  quite different characterisation of more recent 
(2008–2013) employment growth. Instead of upgrading, growth is quite evenly distributed across the 
quintiles, with a modest bump upwards in the middle. This contrasts with developments in 2001–
2008, which are unambiguously upgrading, whether the scope includes or excludes the self-employed.
The gender employment gap remains larger than that in many other developed countries (58% of 
workers are men and 42% women) and has diminished only marginally over the period covered in 
the analysis. Women have, however, accounted for similar absolute employment growth in the top 
quintile since 2001, as well as greater growth in the middle of the wage distribution. Overall, the 
relative contributions to overall upgrading are of a similar order for both men and women.
One of the main developments since 2001 has been the large expansion of primarily state-funded 
sectors as well as the more general growth of knowledge-intensive services (Figure 33). A  large 
expansion of state welfare provision increased employment in education in 2001–2008 (especially 
in top-quintile jobs) and in the health and social work sectors after 2008 (mainly in the middle and 
bottom quintiles).
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Figure 33: Employment shifts by job‑wage quintile (absolute per annum) in public services, 
South Korea, 2001–2013
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Source: South Korea national report
South Korea is, of course, also a major exporting country. It has a highly developed and competitive 
manufacturing base and an increasing trade surplus concentrated in high-tech manufactured 
products. It has maintained this status, with a manufacturing employment share comparable to 
that of the EU (16.7% of total employment in 2013) and is contracting at comparable rates (0.25 
percentage points annually between 2001 and 2013 after much sharper annual falls of 0.8 percentage 
points in the preceding decade 1991–2001).
Figure 34: Employment shifts by job‑wage quintile (absolute per annum) in manufacturing, 
South Korea, 2001–2013
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Employment shifts within manufacturing have been clearly upgrading, especially during 2001–
2008, when the key feature was employment growth in the top quintile in low-technology-intensive 
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and, especially, high-technology-intensive industries (Figure 34). Employment destruction in 
manufacturing has been largely confined to the mid-paid and mid-low-paid quintiles in low-tech 
industry. Unlike the Russian example, therefore, the employment data from South Korea point to an 
upgrading industrial infrastructure oriented towards higher-skilled employment.
Japan
As in South Korea, interest in changing employment structures and the debate over employment 
polarisation and upgrading takes place in a context of heightened public awareness of inequality. 
This traditionally egalitarian society has experienced growing inequality, coinciding with a period 
of economic stagnation (the ‘lost decades’ of the 1990s and 2000s). Over the same period, the 
labour market has been subject to deregulation, with most employment growth occurring among 
non-standard workers. The literature on growing inequality in Japan identifies opposing vectors of 
labour market influence. Rapidly increased female participation and broad upskilling, reflected in 
the doubling of university enrolment between 1980 and 2010 (to over 50% in 2010), have both had 
equalising impacts in terms of wage dispersion. Skill-biased technological change and labour market 
segmentation have tended to widen disparities.
The Japanese analysis covers an extended time frame and includes separate period coverage for 
1982–2002 and 2002–2012. Employment grew in the first period (by around 0.6% per annum) but 
contracted in the second period (by 0.15% per annum). These declines were partly the consequence 
of the global financial crisis, whose impacts on the Japanese labour market were relatively greater 
than on those of the other big Asian economies.19 Slowing demographic growth also played a role; 
the growth of the working age population began slowing around 1990 and turned negative in 2011.
In both periods covered, the distribution of employment shifts across the quintiles is broadly similar – 
a pattern of polarisation across the top four quintiles with job losses in the bottom quintile. This 
overall pattern of (qualified) polarisation was similar for men and women, although net employment 
growth benefited women more than men in both periods (Figure 35). In well-paid jobs, particularly, 
employment growth for women outstripped that for men in both periods, a pattern also observed in 
many EU Member States as well as at aggregate EU level (Eurofound 2008, 2011, 2014).
From 2002 to 2012, male employment in mid-paid jobs declined sharply, while female employment 
growth in the same quintiles (2 and 3) was modestly positive. This led to an accentuation of 
the polarisation of male employment during the most recent period. The reason for this strong 
differentiation by gender was, again, the one familiar from recent EU analysis: sharp job losses in 
construction and manufacturing, predominantly male-employing sectors.
19 The Japanese labour market has, nonetheless, maintained comparatively very low levels of unemployment, notwithstanding the ‘lost 
decades’; the peak rate after the global financial crisis was 5.6%. 
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Figure 35: Employment shifts by job‑wage quintile and gender, Japan, 1982–2012
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Source: Kambayashi, 2014, based on author’s calculation from ESS 1982, 2002, 2012
A significant process of destandardisation of employment has occurred in Japan in the period covered 
by the analysis, one that is quite distinctive compared with similar developments in many European 
countries. Traditionally characterised by strong internal labour markets, long tenure and job stability, 
the Japanese labour market has seen a large growth in non-standard employment since the 1980s 
(Duell et al, 2010).
Significantly, the most important determinant of whether a worker is in the ‘core’ or ‘periphery’ in the 
workplace in Japan is not contractual (open-ended or fixed-term) or based on working time (part time 
or full time) but whether job titles are standard (Seishain) or non-standard (Hi-Seishain) (Kambayashi 
and Kato, 2013). Hi-Seishain workers tend to work shorter hours, earn much lower hourly wages than 
their standard counterparts, have less security of employment, and are much less likely to be covered 
by work-related health, social and unemployment insurance (Duell et al, 2010).
Figure 36: Employment shifts by job‑wage quintile and employment status, Japan, 1982–2012
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Nearly all net employment growth in the period 1982–2012 was accounted for by non-standard 
workers (Figure 36). This partly reflects greater female participation, as the majority of Hi-Seishain are 
women. The category of informal workers includes those that do not have labour contracts, such as 
executives, self-employed and family workers and employment in this category declined, especially 
in the lower quintiles. Employment based on the traditional ‘standard’ employment relationship grew 
only in well-paid top-quintile jobs and then only in the period up to 2002. Afterwards, there was 
stagnation at either end of the wage distribution for standard jobs and sharp losses in mid-paid jobs.
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Overall, the transformation of the Japanese labour market has seen growing non-standard 
employment offset declining family work and self-employment and, to a  lesser extent, declining 
standard employment. The increase in non-standard employment has occurred across the wage 
distribution (albeit with a  concentration in mid-low-paid jobs) and accounts, for example, for 
a majority of net new employment in the top two quintiles as well as those lower down the wage 
distribution. As such, it is not clear that this growth of non-standard employment has contributed 
to polarisation. The process of labour market segmentation appears, nonetheless, to have been 
pervasive and also to have accelerated after 2002.
Australia
The Australian economy was relatively unaffected by the global financial crisis and has ‘experienced 
over two decades of uninterrupted economic growth’ (Wright et al, 2015). In this regard, it resembles 
its Asian counterparts. In addition to regional proximity, the specific buffer in Australia’s case was 
a resource boom fuelled in particular by demand from China.
Other institutional developments important for understanding recent shifts in the Australian 
employment structure include the opening of the economy and the lowering of tariff barriers in 
the mid-1980s. This was accompanied by a phase of privatisation, financial deregulation and tax 
reform initiated by a reformist Labour government. Thereafter, significant deregulation of the labour 
market took place in the 1990s, with the pace of change accelerating from the mid-2000s. This phase 
of deregulation included flexibilisation of national wage-setting mechanisms, decentralisation of 
collective bargaining and the dilution of some employment protection provisions.
One important consequence of the more recent resource boom has been the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar, which has implications for manufacturing sectors reliant on export markets.
The Australian analysis covers the decade 2001–2010 in two separate periods (2001–2006 and 
2006–2010). Both periods saw significant employment growth, although growth slowed marginally 
in the second period (Figure 37). Throughout the decade, employment shifts were clearly upgrading, 
with the greatest employment growth in the top two quintiles. The upgrading pattern was even 
more pronounced in the most recent period, with 43% of net employment growth in high-paid, 
top-quintile jobs.20
Over the entire period, employment growth has been more or less equally spread in absolute terms 
between men and women, with a consequent modest narrowing of the gender employment gap. 
The female share of employment grew from 47.7% in 2001 to 48.4% in 2010. Similar developments 
occurred in most developed countries arising from increased female labour market participation.
20 Note that the Australian analysis is restricted to employees only (excluding self-employment) and may therefore tend to exaggerate 
upgrading. 
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Figure 37: Employment shifts (annual average) by job‑wage quintile and gender, Australia, 
2001–2010
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Source: Australia national report – Wright et al, 2015
How these employment gains were differentially distributed across the wage quintiles in Australia 
also echoes patterns observed in the EU in recent data (Eurofound, 2014) as well as in Japan (see 
Figure 35). Women accounted for most employment gains in the top-paid jobs in both periods (56%–
59%) but also in lower-paid jobs. Men, meanwhile, accounted for over two-thirds of employment 
growth in mid-paid jobs. The jobs that contributed most to employment growth (in 2006–2010) 
offer a partial explanation. The three jobs that grew most were health professionals and education 
professionals in their respective sectors (predominantly female, well-paid jobs) and carers in the 
health sector (again predominantly female but low-paid). The other job with the biggest employment 
gain was that of construction workers (almost exclusively mid-paid, male workers).
Figure 38: Employment shifts (annual average) by job‑wage quintile for full‑time and 
part‑time employment, Australia, 2001–2010
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Australia has a significant and growing share of part-time workers. Three in every 10 employees work 
part time, and part-time work accounted for around one in three net new jobs during the decade to 
2010. While part-time work grew in every quintile in both sub-periods covered, growth was highest 
in low-paid, bottom-quintile jobs where almost all employment growth was part time (Figure 38). In 
well-paid jobs (in the top two quintiles), the share of part time in net employment growth was in the 
range 20%–23% in both periods – substantial, but below the general part-time share of employment. 
Another proxy of atypical employment status – the extent of paid leave entitlements, which is not 
legally mandated for casual workers in Australia – reinforces the impression of a growing share 
of casual or non-standard employment in low-paid jobs. Over three-quarters (77%) of net new 
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employment in the bottom quintile was without paid leave entitlements in 2006–2010, compared 
with 10% in top-quintile jobs. As the authors conclude, ‘the worst jobs (those in quintile 1) are 
increasingly precarious’ as well as being increasingly part time.
Conclusions
Two broad groups of countries emerged from the job-based analysis of recent employment data 
covering the six non-EU countries and the EU. The first group comprises the EU, Japan and the 
US, which have mature, developed economies and high GDP per head; in these, a  pattern of 
‘asymmetrically polarised’ employment growth was observed similar to that in the original US 
analysis covering the 1990s (Wright and Dwyer, 2003). This was upwardly skewed across the wage 
distribution, and the key features were faster growth in well-paid jobs, lower but still above-average 
growth in low-paid jobs and weaker growth in a ‘shrinking middle’. Downturns accentuated the 
pace of contraction of mid-paid employment. In the second group of developed and post-transition 
countries with higher levels of output growth in the periods covered (Australia, China, Russia and 
South Korea), employment shifts were more clearly upgrading. A suggestive inference is that of 
an association between higher rates of output growth and employment upgrading and between 
lower rates of economic growth and polarisation. The relationship holds for developments across the 
business cycle in individual countries – for example, the sharp employment polarisation observed 
in the EU and the US during their respective slumps in the global recession (2007/2008–2010) – as 
well as between countries. The presence of many factors depressing growth rates below long-term 
trend rates in the mature, developed economies (high levels of public and private debt, weakening 
public and private investment levels, population ageing and other factors loosely grouped under 
the term ‘secular stagnation’) are more likely to contribute to polarising and downgrading than 
upgrading employment shifts. Even among the upgrading group of countries, to the extent that 
predictions were made by the national report authors, they were that employment shifts would be 
less favourable in terms of aggregate employment quality in the future. Russia, for example, will 
have to deal with significant demographic headwinds reversing the increased supply of workers of 
working age in recent decades and limiting the pace of skills improvement that contributed to recent 
upgrading. China, too, will face similar demographic issues arising from its one-child policy and 
related challenges due to the eroding labour reserve of rural workers.
The observation that well-paid employment grows fastest in periods of high growth and mid-paid 
employment declines fastest during downturns often has simple explanations in terms of the 
long-term shifts in the sectoral composition of employment.
One of the key drivers of employment destruction is the rate of deindustrialisation. This affects 
predominantly mid-paid manufacturing jobs and its impacts in terms of ‘shrinking the middle’ are 
strongest in the mature, richer, developed countries, with a notable sharpening during economic 
downturns. In the upgrading group of countries, manufacturing employment is either comparatively 
resilient (South Korea) or its losses are compensated by growth in other similarly paid jobs (for 
example, in construction in Australia and in the public sector in Russia). The counterpart of advanced 
economy deindustrialisation is the rapid rise of Chinese manufacturing and its contribution to 
employment growth in that country. These are linked phenomena, the consequences of greater 
global market integration, large labour cost differentials and the high tradability of manufacturing 
sector outputs.
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An important (negative) contributor to employment upgrading is the rate of decline of agricultural 
employment. Rapid displacement of agricultural employment results in the destruction of mainly 
lower-quintile employment – generally accompanied by the creation of better-paid employment 
in other, growing sectors. This process has been particularly dramatic in China, but sharp falls 
in agricultural employment continued to be observed in Japan, Russia and South Korea right up 
to the first periods covered in the analysis and subsiding thereafter. In a European context, this 
phenomenon is of little relevance in most developed western European countries, where agriculture 
accounts for a more stable and much lower share of total employment (for example, 1% in the UK 
and 2% in Germany), but it is still a very important dimension of structural employment change in 
more recently acceding Member States, notably Poland and Romania.
In all countries covered – with China only a partial exception – service sectors have been responsible 
for more net new employment than that destroyed in the declining sectors. Strong private services 
employment growth was mainly in less knowledge-intensive services in China and Russia and 
in knowledge-intensive services in developed countries and the EU. In the former countries, 
a distinguishing feature was growing employment in retail sectors, still in a phase of rapid catch-up 
growth after relatively recent transitions to a market-based economy. Growth (or lack of it) in public 
services employment (including health and education) tended to be quite period-specific, for example 
in Australia, Japan and South Korea, indicative of the direct influence of the prevailing government 
on employment levels in predominantly publicly funded sectors.
Gender employment gaps were closing across the countries covered. There was some corroboration 
of recent findings from jobs-based analysis of the EU (Eurofound, 2014) and US (Wright and Dwyer, 
2003) that women were accounting for the majority of employment growth in well-paid jobs. This was 
observed also in Australia and Japan in both periods covered. Occupational change has tended to 
favour women, to the extent that employment in many well-paid, predominantly female jobs, often 
in the public services (such as educators and medical professionals), has been expanding, while 
predominantly male-employing jobs have been in decline.
Now to revisit some of the questions posed at the outset, which it was hoped this broader international, 
comparative application of the jobs-based approach might help to elucidate. Of course, a large caveat 
is that all answers are based on a very limited sample and, therefore, should be taken as tentative 
and provisional; but they are possible directions for future research and testing.
• Have the employment shifts observed been favourable in terms of aggregate employment 
quality?
In all countries and periods featured, the main patterns varied between clear upgrading (in Russia) 
and clear polarisation (in the EU and USA during 2007/2008–2010), with some hybrid polarising and 
upgrading (in Japan). Upgrading patterns were more common than polarisation. No downgrading 
employment shifts were identified though it is important nonetheless to take note of some recent 
suggestive evidence of downgrading from the US (Autor, 2010) in the period 1999-2007 and from 
some EU Member States during the post-crisis period.
• Do different stages of economic development and rates of growth have an impact on the 
qualitative shifts of employment observed?
Both appear to be important. The stage of economic development affects the composition of 
employment and its rate of reallocation between primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. A quite 
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distinctive pattern of employment growth can be seen; for example, in China, the main employment 
reallocation is from agriculture to manufacturing and services, whereas in all of the other countries, 
reallocation is more from agriculture and manufacturing to services.
As already described, the rate of economic growth also appears to affect the extent to which developed 
countries exhibit employment shift patterns on the spectrum from polarisation to upgrading. Periods 
of faster economic growth are more likely to involve clear upgrading of the employment structure. 
The reason for this is partly that a higher share of better paid and more productive jobs is both cause 
and effect of greater economic growth.
• Is the hypothesis of skill‑biased technological change applicable mainly to post‑industrial 
economies where the ‘service transition’ is in a mature phase?
This is not easy to answer. Work in less knowledge-intensive service sectors such as retail, or in 
construction or manufacturing, the main growth sectors in China, may require different skills, but 
to what extent these are higher-level skills than those deployed in the declining agricultural sector 
is unclear. Given the similarities between developments in China in the last generation and those in 
the first industrial revolutions, it is worth recalling that technical change was largely ‘skill-replacing’ 
rather than ‘skill-biased’ in the transition from artisanal to factory production (Acemoglu, 2002). 
The Russian case also cast some doubt over an explanation of observed employment shifts based 
on skill-biased technological change. Here, there was significant employment growth that was 
clearly upgrading, but it occurred in a context of a deteriorating industrial infrastructure, with only 
a marginal contribution of high-tech or knowledge-intensive sectors to overall employment growth. 
Skill-biased organisational change was considered a more plausible explanation of the changes 
observed and related to specific historical circumstances, such as recent marketisation after the 
abandonment of Soviet-era central planning. Nonetheless, the predominant pattern observed across 
the countries – employment upgrading, in some cases linear and monotonic – was that predicted by 
skill-biased technological change.
• What does the descriptive analysis indicate about the changing global division of labour?
It largely corroborates what is known from other sources about the shift of manufacturing activity and 
employment from developed, mature economies to China and other lower-labour-cost destinations. 
The shrinking middle in high-GDP countries is largely attributable to declines in mid-paid 
manufacturing employment and has its counterpart in the Chinese growing middle, boosted in 
particular by that country’s emergence as a manufacturing power. This shift, of course, relates just 
to the most globalised of sectors in terms of tradability, manufacturing. Global value chains are much 
less developed in services, and shifts in services employment are more likely to be affected by local 
or national circumstances.
• Can any links be identified between specific institutional labour market features and 
specific patterns of employment shift?
Institutional labour market developments were identified as an important contextual feature 
of employment shifts in a number of the country-specific analyses. In the main, these involved 
destandardisation of the employment relationship – for example, the increase in ‘non-standard’ work 
titles in Japan, and the large and growing share of part-time employment in Australia, similar to the 
EU. The destandardisation of the employment relationship in Japan has been particularly pervasive, 
with non-standard workers accounting for the vast majority of net new employment in both periods 
and indications that this process has accelerated. This has occurred across the wage distribution. 
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Similar to the conclusions based on recent EU data, standard employment in Japan has tended to 
grow only in jobs in the top quintile. Standard, traditional or core-worker status appears increasingly 
to be the privilege of those in better-paid jobs.
Finally, the Global Jobs Project also provides suggestive evidence of other factors influencing changes 
in the employment structure. The principal broad factors identified to date are technology and 
technical change, trade and globalisation, and labour market institutional effects. All are likely to 
have played an important role in shifting demand for specific categories of work and worker. The 
view that technology – and specifically ‘routine-biased technical change’ – is the key factor has 
become something of an orthodoxy, notably among labour economists (Autor, 2006; Goos et al, 
2009), but has also been increasingly contested (Mishel et al, 2013; Oesch, 2013; Eurofound, 2014). 
The field of potentially significant factors has broadened to give greater place, for example, to factors 
on the labour market supply side. Employers make their decisions to hire not just based on product 
or service demand but on the availability of suitably skilled workers. For this reason, factors such 
as educational upskilling (Oesch, 2013), increased labour market participation of women (Dwyer, 
2013) and levels of migrant labour (Wright and Dwyer, 2003; Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón, 2012) 
have entered the debate. Growing inequality may also have a role in the changing distribution of 
employment across occupations, notably via consumption spillover effects (Mazzolari and Ragusa, 
2007).
Some of the national contributions (from Australia, Russia and South Korea) serve as a reminder 
of the role of the state as a  job creator: governments do create jobs. The level of public service 
employment varies markedly from country to country in line with historical path dependencies and 
contemporary political – and electoral – choices. To the extent that state-funded employment is more 
likely to be higher-skilled and higher-paid, these variations will affect aggregate employment quality.
It has also been seen how a host of historical, macroeconomic and business-cycle factors influence 
shifts in the employment structure in the countries covered. Sufficient attention is not always paid 
to these. In the EU, there was a clear sharpening of employment polarisation in the recession that 
followed the global financial crisis in 2008 and, more generally, polarisation was associated with 
periods of slowing output growth.
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Annex 1: Construction of the job 
rankings
This annex provides details about the process of constructing the job-wage, job-education and 
job-quality rankings used in this report.
The jobs-based approach that underlies the EJM is based on studying change in employment across 
occupations and sectors from the perspective of some specific job-quality ordinal index. The process 
is as follows:
1.  overall employment is split into jobs (occupations within sectors at the two-digit level of ISCO and 
NACE, respectively);
2. those jobs are ranked and grouped according to some job-quality indicator;
3. the change in employment numbers across jobs is plotted against their quality.
In the original Jobs project (Eurofound, 2008; Fernández-Macías et al, 2012), two fixed rankings 
were used for analysing structural change in employment in 23 European countries between 
1995 and 2007. One of those rankings was based on the average educational level of workers within 
each job, drawing from EU-LFS data. The other ranking was based on the average hourly pay of 
workers within each job and was constructed from different statistical sources combined at the job 
level.21 Those two rankings provided a sound basis for analysing structural change in employment 
between 1995 and 2007 across the EU.
From 2008, the classification of sectors in the EU-LFS moved to Revision 2.0 of the NACE international 
standard, and from 2011, the classification of occupations in the EU-LFS moved to the 08 version 
of the ISCO international standard. In both cases, the revisions were so substantial that there is no 
compatibility between the old and the new classification systems at any level of aggregation; hence 
the discontinuity is unavoidable.
Construction of the educational ranking
This ranking is the simplest because the EU-LFS includes all the necessary information to construct 
it. The basis for this ranking is the variable International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED) included the EU-LFS datasets. ISCED is an internationally comparable codification of 
national educational systems, which was originally designed by UNESCO in the 1970s and updated 
several times. A highly aggregated version of ISCED was used, which distinguishes three broad levels 
of education:
• low (basic schooling or less, below ISCED 2);
• medium (upper secondary and post-secondary pre-tertiary, ISCED 3–4);
• high (tertiary, ISCED 5 and above).
For each country, the average educational level of all workers within each job was calculated, 
assigning an arbitrary value of 0 to low, 0.5 to medium and 1 to high educational level. These values 
21 The underlying structure of this ranking was provided by the 2002 European Union Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). To cover for jobs not 
included in the SES sample, it was necessary to complement it with data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey 
and the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), as well as with data from national accounts to provide more 
detailed data on wages in the manufacturing sector (see Eurofound, 2008b for more details).
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were used to generate the educational ranking.22 For the period 2011 Q2 to 2014 Q2, these average 
values are based on the pooled data for 2011 Q1–2014 Q2 (with German data omitted for 2011 for 
reasons identified in Annex 2).
Construction of the wage ranking
As in previous analyses of the EJM data, the construction of the wage ranking is more complicated 
(Eurofound, 2008b, 2011). The main reason is that the EU-LFS does not include a variable that 
measures wages as a continuous quantity that can be divided by the number of hours worked 
in order to get an indicator of hourly labour compensation. Up to 2009, there was no mandatory 
collection of wage data at all, which forced previous analyses of the EJM to use external data for this 
purpose (Eurofound, 2008b) – or to rely on voluntarily submitted wage data, which covered less than 
half of the Member States and was of variable quality.
From 2009, the EU-LFS includes a variable that positions each worker in the distribution of wages 
of their country within a decile scale. This variable causes two problems for the purposes of this 
analysis: first, it provides only a very crude approximation to the actual distribution of wages in each 
country, providing just 10 possible values instead of the full complexity of a continuous variable; 
second, it allows only the identification of the relative position of each worker within a 10-point scale, 
without the monetary values that correspond to each position in such scale. Because of the latter 
problem, it is impossible to calculate even an approximate value for hourly wage.
Unfortunately, there is no EU-wide data source that allows the calculation of a reliable estimate of 
average hourly wages at the job level. The closest match is the European Union Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES), last carried out in 2010, which includes a continuous variable of wages and another 
on working hours and allows for classification of workers by sector (NACE Rev. 2.0) and occupation 
(ISCO-08). However, this source does not cover the full economy, leaving out the public sector and 
agriculture, as well as all companies with fewer than 10 employees.
In the end, a job-wage ranking was used based on a combination of the SES 2010 data and the 
income decile data from the 2011 EU-LFS. The SES data were used to calculate average hourly wages 
per job within each country and to generate a nationally specific ranking with it (with interpolation 
of a weighted EU average ranking in order to fill the gaps in national rankings). The EU-LFS data 
were used to calculate an average income decile position for full-time workers within jobs in which at 
least 50% of occupants work full time, applying the same EU average interpolation. Finally, the two 
normalised rankings were averaged and re-normalised. The reason for using two different sources is 
that no single source is adequate for the purposes of analysing the employment structure. A simple 
average at the job level of two different normalised job quality rankings (each of them incomplete on 
its own) should provide a more reliable indicator that can be used to rank the jobs and study their 
evolution over time.
22 Because the basis for the ranking is the average of just three values (0, 0.5 and 1), there are some jobs that have exactly the same value 
(for instance, professional jobs occupied only by workers with third-level education) and that cannot therefore be unambiguously ordered. 
Because of this, the authors constructed an EU-level average of the national averages that was used as a secondary ranking variable (so 
if two jobs had the same value at the national level, they were sorted according to their EU-level average, which is much less likely to be 
identical because it is based in a much larger sample).
Annex 1: Construction of the job rankings
89
Construction of the non‑pecuniary job quality ranking
The third job-ranking criterion is a multidimensional indicator covering four major dimensions of job 
quality identified in the job quality literature – intrinsic job quality; employment quality; workplace 
risks; and working time and work–life balance. The indicator is non-pecuniary in that it does not 
include any component based on wage or work income. This omission is deliberate in order to avoid 
overlap with the primary job-wage ranking. The indicator is based on combining data from over 
40 questions from the 2010 European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). Individual jobs are 
then ranked based on their average score across the included variables. For a full account of the 
construction of the job-quality ranking, see Eurofound, 2013, Chapter 3.
Both the educational and wage rankings are generated at Member State and aggregate EU level. The 
non-pecuniary job-quality ranking is a common EU-based ranking due to the limited sample size of 
the EWCS at Member State level.
90
Annex 2: Handling of data breaks
Table A1: How major classification or data breaks were dealt with
Country Nature of break Year and 
quarter
Impact Solution
France ISCO occupational 
classification break
2013 Q1 Some reassignment of 
employment across ISCO 
categories. Obvious mainly at 
two-digit level.
Aggregate ISCO two digit to one 
digit for ISCO two-digit categories 
10–54.
Germany ISCO occupational 
classification break 
2012 Q1 Significant reassignment 
of employment across ISCO 
categories, at one-digit and 
two-digit level of detail.
Use 2012 Q2–2014 Q2 data for all 
German charts, omitting the first 
year. 
Netherlands ISCO occupational 
classification break
2013 Q1 Some reassignment of 
employment across ISCO 
categories. Obvious mainly at 
two-digit level.
Aggregate ISCO two digit to 
one digit for the Manager and 
Professional categories (ISCO 12–14) 
and the clerical category (ISCO 40–44) 
for the entire period.
Note: This simple fix could not be 
implemented for, and does not 
address, possible reassignment 
of associate professionals to 
professional status in same 
quarter. As a result, charts for 
the Netherlands may exaggerate 
upgrading and should be read with 
caution.
Romania Major revision 
downwards of 
employment estimates 
due to census revision 
of population 
estimates (‑7%).
2014 Q1 Eliminates circa 600,000 
Romanian jobs and raises 
the estimate of employment 
growth in Romania and the 
EU in 2011 Q2–2014 Q2.
Rescale employment from 2011 
Q2 to 2013 Q2 downwards for all 
jobs to reflect the census-based 
revision.
Other breaks are identified by Eurostat for other Member States in different quarters, for the core 
variables (ISCO and NACE) as well as for employment estimates. However, adjustments were only 
made in the above cases as they involved obviously artificial and large shifts in employment share 
by occupation.
For the EU28 aggregate figures for 2011 Q2, the missing year of German data is accounted for 
by backcasting the German data from 2012 Q2 to 2011 Q2 using the aggregate employment shift 
observed – in other words, preserving the structure of employment observed in 2012 Q2. For 
the EU28 aggregates in the breakdown charts (for example, gender and full-time and part-time 
employment), the missing year of German data again relies on backcasting of the 2012 Q2 data to 
2011 Q2, preserving the ISCO and NACE structure of employment observed in 2012 Q2 but with 
the additional modification of factoring in the observed German changes in employment for 2011 
Q2–2012 Q2 for the categories of the breakdown variable(s).
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Annex 3: Aggregate employment shifts 
in Member States
Table A2: Employment shifts (in thousands) by country according to wage quintile, 
2011 Q2–2014 Q2
2011 total 
employment 4,141  4,544 2,946 402 4,877 39,958 2,713 597 4,124 18,622 2,517 25,845 1,480 3,809 1,861
 AT  BE  BG  CY  CZ DE  DK  EE  EL  ES  FI  FR  HU  HR  IE 
Quintile 1 ‑7 -6 14 -2 ‑13 183 2 11 ‑47 ‑97 ‑17 0 95 -15 15
Quintile 2 ‑23 -98 ‑23 ‑7 17 195 -21 -6 -129 ‑403 16 107 63 ‑27 25
Quintile 3 -19 ‑36 ‑23 -16 -1 195 ‑34 1 -202 ‑397 -18 314 85 17 -2
Quintile 4 17 ‑4 44 ‑14 -18 6 21 7 -152 -262 13 ‑415 45 37 ‑13
Quintile 5 113 145 21 1 101 44 22 14 -55 -108 ‑23 ‑14 25 75 16
Total employment 
gain/loss 81 1 33 ‑37 86 623 -10 27 -585 ‑1267 -28 -9 312 88 40
2011 total 
employment 23,094 1,262 222 859 166 8,345 15,578 4,799 8,572 4,645 938 2,319 29,063 217,992 
 IT  LT  LU  LV  MT  NL  PL  PT  RO  SE  SI  SK  UK  EU 
Quintile 1 307 17 ‑4 -20 5 ‑4 ‑48 -112 54 19 11 71 367 333
Quintile 2 ‑312 0 0 20 ‑3 ‑14 -295 -115 9 ‑36 5 35 181 ‑336
Quintile 3 ‑153 10 8 27 3 ‑54 73 ‑138 19 0 -11 -2 133 ‑536
Quintile 4 ‑341 19 13 ‑7 6 -95 98 10 79 78 -19 ‑38 274 ‑377
Quintile 5 ‑147 2 8 11 -1 85 387 71 -59 73 5 ‑33 439 1,550 
Total employment 
gain/loss ‑646 48 24 31 11 -82 214 -285 102 133 -8 34 1,394 633
Note: 2012 Q2–2014 Q2 data for Germany. See Annex 2 for other data adjustments.
Table A3: Employment shifts (in thousands) by country according to wage quintile, 
2013 Q2–2014 Q2
2013 total 
employment 4,172 4,549 2,940 365 4,953 40,485 2,698 632 3,535 17,161 2,506 25,810 1,542 3,931 1,870
 AT  BE  BG  CY  CZ  DE  DK  EE  EL  ES  FI  FR  HU  HR  IE 
Quintile 1 46 ‑27 ‑4 4 -22 117 22 -5 26 22 ‑7 93 39 3 6
Quintile 2 ‑13 ‑72 -9 0 14 8 5 -5 31 35 -1 30 49 ‑23 19
Quintile 3 ‑17 -19 10 1 27 61 -8 6 15 90 4 262 53 8 6
Quintile 4 ‑14 23 14 -8 5 ‑67 -12 -2 ‑46 66 0 -290 37 0 -1
Quintile 5 48 91 29 3 -15 -22 -2 -2 ‑23 -20 ‑13 -60 12 36 1
Total employment 
gain/loss 50 ‑4 39 0 9 97 6 -8 4 192 ‑17 36 190 24 32
2013 total 
employment 22,460 1,297 238 889 175 8,369 15,528 4,425 8,698 4,716 904 2,328 29,639 216,813 
 IT  LT  LU  LV  MT  NL  PL  PT  RO  SE  SI  SK  UK  EU 
Quintile 1 -6 16 -6 -2 1 2 38 ‑64 2 2 23 17 274 539
Quintile 2 -58 -2 1 6 1 -29 -98 ‑45 ‑43 -5 1 3 188 341
Quintile 3 113 10 4 ‑3 2 10 131 34 ‑4 5 5 -16 143 505
Quintile 4 ‑34 ‑14 8 0 -1 ‑63 45 67 46 26 ‑13 -8 54 ‑64
Quintile 5 -28 3 0 0 0 14 147 97 ‑24 34 10 30 165 562
Total employment 
gain/loss ‑13 12 8 0 2 ‑67 264 90 ‑23 62 27 26 825 1,883 
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Annex 4: Categorisation of the 
service sector
Table A4: Knowledge‑based services aggregation – breakdown by NACE Rev. 2 two‑digit 
sector
Private 
knowledge-intensive 
services
50 to 51 Water transport, Air transport
58 Publishing activities
59 to 63 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music 
publishing activities; Programming and broadcasting activities; Telecommunications; Computer 
programming, consultancy and related activities; Information service activities
64 to 66 Financial and insurance activities (section k)
69 to 71 Legal and accounting activities; Activities of head offices, management consultancy activities; 
Architectural and engineering activities, technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific research and development
75 Veterinary activities
73 to 74 Advertising and market research; Other professional, scientific and technical activities
78 Employment activities
80 Security and investigation activities
90 to 93 Arts, entertainment and recreation (section R)
Public 
knowledge-intensive 
services
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (section O)
85 Education (section P)
86 to 88 Human health and social work activities (section Q)
Less knowledge-intensive 
services
45 to 47 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (section G)
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
53 Postal and courier activities
55 to 56 Accommodation and food services activities (section I)
68 Real estate activities
77 Rental and leasing activities
79 Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities
95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods
94 Activities of membership organisations
96 Other personal service activities
97 to 99 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel; Undifferentiated goods‑and 
services-producing activities of private households for own use (section T); Activities of extraterritorial 
organisations and bodies (section U)
Source: Eurostat, Eurostat indicators on high-tech industry and knowledge-intensive services, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf
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As noted in the 2014 EJM annual report (Eurofound, 2014, pp. 29 and 41), it is important to bear 
in mind that the shape of the employment shifts observed depends on the particular job-quality 
criterion used to rank jobs. In most of the analysis in this and related previous work (Eurofound 
2008a, 2011, 2013, 2014), job-wage has been used as the primary ranking criterion. Wages are only 
one dimension of job quality, but they are an important one, highly correlated with other relevant 
aspects of job quality. The use of mean or median job (or occupation) wage as the basic ranking 
criterion has also been the common approach of much of the employment polarisation literature 
(Autor, 2010; Goos and Manning, 2007).
As Figure A1 highlights, however, using job-wage to rank jobs and assign them to quintiles tends to 
generate more polarised patterns of employment change (greater relative growth at the edges, less in 
the middle) than other ranking criteria.
Figure A1: Annual percentage employment change by wage, education and job quality 
quintile, EU, 2011 Q2–2014 Q2
-2
0
2
Wage
-2
0
2
Education
-2
0
2
Job quality
Note: Q2 data in each year. Data adjusted for breaks in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Romania as indicated in 
Annex 2.
Source: EU-LFS, SES, EWCS (own calculations)
In Figure A1, observed employment shifts in the EU in 2011 Q2–2014 Q2 are compared using the 
main job-wage ranking, an education-based ranking and a non-pecuniary job-quality ranking. The 
education ranking is based on the average achieved educational level of job-holders (using the 
ISCED-based hatlev1d variable in the EU-LFS). The job-quality ranking is based on a multidimensional 
non-pecuniary job-quality indicator based on answers to 38 questions in the 2010 EWCS (see Annex 
2 for notes and references regarding construction of the index).
There are some points of similarity between the three charts, reflecting the high correlation (>0.7) 
between the different measures of job quality used to rank jobs. The top quintile is growing regardless 
of the ranking criterion, and job destruction is concentrated in the lower quintiles – quintiles 2 and 
3 for the wage-based ranking, quintile 1 for the education-based and job-quality-based rankings. 
Both in terms of education and non-pecuniary job quality, the pattern has been one of occupational 
upgrading in this period, with gains in the top quintile counterbalanced by declines in the bottom 
quintile. Only for the wage-based ranking is there a more polarised employment shift, with relative 
loss in the middle quintiles, although, again, the single most obvious feature of the wage-based chart 
is strong growth at the top (signifying upgrading).
The reason for the (modest) differences between the three measures is that a substantial proportion 
of jobs in the middle of the wage distribution have a relative wage premium (a higher relative position 
in terms of wages than education or non-pecuniary job-quality attributes) and that these jobs have 
Annex 5: Comparing employment shifts 
using different job‑quality measures
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been responsible for a large share of overall job destruction during the crisis. As Table 1 in Chapter 
1 illustrated, two of the largest-employing jobs in the EU are building and related trades workers in 
construction and drivers and mobile plant operators in transport. Both are in the middle quintile (3) 
of the wage distribution, but only the first or second quintile in terms of education or broader job 
quality. These archetypal blue collar, male jobs have both shed employment throughout 2008–2014 
and contribute to explaining the differences between the three charts.
So anxieties about the ‘shrinking middle’ relate mainly to employment shifts when categorised using 
one measure of job quality – wages. Other important measures tend to show shifts in a more upgrading 
light, consistent with the predictions of skill-biased technological change. This recalls Daniel Oesch’s 
conclusion following a jobs-based analysis of the pre-crisis period (1990–2008) in five European 
countries: ‘the employment drop in the lower-middle and middle quintiles concerns comparatively 
well-paid working-class jobs’ (Oesch, 2013, p.57). The jobs that have been disproportionately affected 
by employment loss during the crisis have been mid-paid jobs that do not require high levels of 
formal education.
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Annex 6: List of sources for Chapter 2 
analysis
Table A5: Periods of analysis, main classifications and databases used in analysis of Spain
Period Occupation Sector of activity Source of jobs rank
1977a–1985a, b CNO‑79 (2 digits) CNAE‑74 (2 digits)
Basic Household Budget Survey 1990–1991 (activity 
at 1 digit) + Labour Force Survey 1977 (education 
ranking for the primary sector at 2 digits)
1985a, b–1991b CNO‑79 (2 digits) CNAE‑74 (2 digits)
Basic Household Budget Survey 1990–1991 (activity 
at 1 digit) + Labour Force Survey 1977 (education 
ranking for the primary sector at 2 digits)
1991b–1992c CNO‑79 (2 digits) CNAE‑74 (2 digits)
Basic Household Budget Survey 1990–1991 (activity 
at 1 digit) + Labour Force Survey 1977 (education 
ranking for the primary sector at 2 digits)
1992c–1993c CNO‑79 (2 digits) Broad groups of sectors of 
activity
Basic Household Budget Survey 1990–1991 (activity 
at 1 digit) + Labour Force Survey 1977 (education 
ranking for the primary sector at 2 digits)
1994a, c–2005a CNO‑94 (2 digits) CNAE‑93 (2 digits)
Wage Structure Survey 2006 + Survey of Living 
Conditions 2006 (for the primary sector and domestic 
servants)
2005a–2008b, CNO‑94 (2 digits) CNAE‑93 (2 digits)
Wage Structure Survey 2006 + Survey of Living 
Conditions 2006 (for the primary sector and domestic 
servants)
2008b, c–2010c CNO‑94 (2 digits) CNAE-09 (2 digits) Survey of Living Conditions 2009 and 2010
2010c–2013a CNO-11 (2 digits) CNAE-09 (2 digits)
Wage Structure Survey 2010 + Labour Force Survey 
2010 (education ranking for the primary sector and 
domestic servants)
Notes:
a Year selected because it is part of a period initially proposed to be analysed; 
b year selected because it is the start or the end of an economic cycle (in terms of employment);
c year selected because there is a change in a classification.
1977 is used instead of 1976 because there is the first available Q” of Spanish Labour Force Survey; 1992–1993 will be 
analysed using only occupation (2 digits) and broad groups of sectors of activity if possible; 1994–2008 instead of 1994–
1995 and 1995–2008 is analysed in order to reduce the number of periods analysed.
Table A6: Periods of analysis, main classifications and databases used in analysis of the UK
Period LFS 
employment 
data
Occupation Industry
NES/ 
ASHE 
wage data
Data citation for wage data
1 1975 1984
Harmonised across LFS 1975, 
LFS 1984 and NES 1980 
KOS 4‑digit to produce 288 
4‑digit categories
Harmonised SIC 
1968 (27 1‑digit 
groups) with SIC 
1980 10 1-digit 
groups
1980
Department of Employment, New 
Earnings Survey, 1980 [computer 
file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data 
Archive [distributor], November 
1987. SN: 2253, http://dx.doi.
org/10.5255/UKDA‑SN‑2253‑1
2 1985 1990
Harmonised NES 1988 
with LFS data; 288 4‑digit 
categories
SIC 1980 – 10 
1-digit groups
1988
Office for National Statistics, New 
Earnings Survey, 1986-2002: Secure 
Access [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
March 2011. SN: 6704
3 1991 2000 SOC 1990 – 371  4‑digit categories
SIC 1992 – 17 
1-digit groups
1995 As above
4 2001 2010 SOC 2000 – 353 4‑digit 
categories
Harmonise SIC 2003 
used in NES 2005 
to fit with SIC 1992 
(LFS 2001) and SIC 
2007 (LFS 2010) – 
16 1-digit groups
2005
Office for National Statistics, Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings, 
1997‑2013: Secure Access [computer 
file]. 5th Edition. Colchester, Essex: 
UK Data Archive [distributor], 
June 2014. SN: 6689,http://dx.doi.
org/10.5255/UKDA‑SN‑6689‑4
5 2011 2014 SOC 2010 – 369 4‑digit 
categories
SIC2007 – 21 
industry groups
2012 As above
Notes: ASHE = Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings; LFS = Labour Force Survey; NES = New Earnings Survey; SIC = Standard 
Industrial Classification; SOC = Standard Occupational Classification
European Jobs Monitor 2015 
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Table A7: Periods of analysis, main classifications and databases used in analysis of Sweden
Labour Force Survey
Wage data
Period Occupation Industry classification
1970 –1975 NYK58 SNI 69 (= ISIC Rev.2)
Population census, tax register, gross labour 
income
1975–1984 NYK58 SNI 69 (= ISIC Rev.2)
Population census, tax register, gross labour 
income
1985–1990 NYK83 SNI 69 (= ISIC Rev.2)
Population census, tax register, gross labour 
income
1991–1996 NYK83 SNI 92 (= NACE Rev. 1) LOUISE, gross labour income
1997–2002 SSYK96 (ISCO-88) SNI 92 (= NACE Rev. 1) LISA, gross labour income
2003–2007 SSYK96 (ISCO-88) SNI 2002 (= NACE Rev. 1.1) LISA, gross labour income
2008–2011 SSYK96 (ISCO-88) SNI 2007 (= NACE Rev. 2) LISA, gross labour income
Notes: NYK = Nordic Occupational Classification; SNI = Swedish Standard Industrial Classification; SSYK = Swedish Stand-
ard Classification of Occupations;
Table A8: Periods of analysis, main classifications and databases used in analysis of Germany
Period Year of ranking Occupation Industry classification Database
1984–1991 1991* ISCO‑88, 3‑digit NACE Rev. 1, 1-digit SOEP only
1992–1997 1997 ISCO‑88, 3‑digit NACE Rev. 1, 1-digit SOEP only
 1998–2001 2001 ISCO‑88, 3‑digit NACE Rev. 1, 1-digit SOEP/ Mikrozensus
 2002–2007 2006 ISCO‑88, 3‑digit NACE Rev. 1, 1-digit SOEP/ Mikrozensus
2008–2011 2008 ISCO‑88, 3‑digit NACE Rev. 1, 1-digit SOEP/ Mikrozensus
Notes: SOEP = German Socio-Economic Panel   
* data available only for the former Federal Republic of Germany
Table A9: Periods of analysis, main classifications and databases used in analysis of Ireland
Period Occupation Industry classification
1971–1981 ISCO-88  
1-digit
IPUMS general sectors (≈NACE 1‑digit) IPUMS for employment, Living in Ireland Survey 1994–1999 for wages
1981–1991
ISCO-88  
1-digit
IPUMS general sectors (≈NACE 1‑digit) IPUMS for employment, Living in Ireland Survey 1994–1999 for wages
1991–1996
ISCO-88  
1-digit
IPUMS general sectors (≈NACE 1‑digit) IPUMS for employment, Living in Ireland Survey 1994–1999 for wages
1996–2006
ISCO-88  
1-digit
IPUMS general sectors (≈NACE 1‑digit) IPUMS for employment, Living in Ireland Survey 1994–1999 for wages
Notes: IPUMS = Integrated Public Microdata Series 
* Sample restricted to 22–64-year-olds
Annex 6: List of sources for Chapter 2 analysis
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Table A10: Periods of analysis, main classifications and databases used in analysis of 
Switzerland
Period Occupation Industry classification
1970–1980 ISCO-88  4‑digit 6 broad sectors
Population census for employment, Swiss Labour 
Force Survey 1993–1998 for wages
1980–1990
ISCO-88  
4‑digit 6 broad sectors
Population census for employment, Swiss Labour 
Force Survey 1993–1998 for wages
1990–2000
ISCO-88  
4‑digit 6 broad sectors
Population census for employment, Swiss Labour 
Force Survey 1993–1998 for wages
2000–2010
ISCO-88  
4‑digit 6 broad sectors
Population census for employment, Swiss Labour 
Force Survey 1993–1998 for wages
* Sample restricted to 22–64-year-olds
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Annex 7: Additional charts relating to 
employment change in six countries
Figure A2: Relative change in job‑wage quintiles in six countries, 1970–2014
Figure A3: Relative change (annual average) in job‑wage quintiles in six countries, 1970–2014
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Annex 8: The Global Jobs Project: 
Papers and participants
National contributions to the Global Jobs Project
Gimpelson, V. and Kapeliushnikov, R. (2014), Polarization or upgrading? Evolution of employment in 
transitionary Russia, draft report received 4 December 2014, published as discussion paper No. 8688, 
IZA, Bonn, available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp8688.pdf.
Du Yang, Qu Xiaobo and Cheng Jie (2014), Changes in the employment structure in China: 2005-10 – 
Report of Global Jobs Project (China), draft report received 22 December 2014.
Dwyer, R. and Wright, E. O. (2015), Preliminary results from US, data and figures received 
12 February 2015.
Hwang, Deok Soon (2014), Changes in Korea’s job quality: 2001-13, draft report received 
17 December 2014.
Kambayashi, R. (2014), Global change in the structure of employment: A note on the Japanese case, draft 
report received 24 October 2014.
Wright, S., Whelan, S., Warhurst, C. and Teicher, J. (2015), The Lucky Country? Employment upgrading 
in Australia in the 2000s, draft report received 17 March 2015.
National partners
Australia Chris Warhurst and Sally Wright (University of Warwick) and Stephen Whelan (Workplace Research Centre, 
University of Sidney Business School)
Brazil Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira (Ibero-American Institute and Free University Berlin)
China Du Yang, Cheng Jie and Qu Xiaobo (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
India Mehtabul Azam (Oklahoma State University and IZA)
Japan Ryo Kambayashi (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University)
Morocco Mustapha Zirioili (Haut Commissariat au Plan)
Russia Vladimir Gimpelson and Rostislav Kapeliushnikov (Centre for Labour Market Studies, National Research 
University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow)
South Korea Deok Soon Hwang (Korea Labor Institute)
US Rachel Dwyer (Ohio State University) and Erik Olin Wright (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Meetings of the Global Jobs Project took place in Dublin (17 May 2013), Brussels (5–6 December 2013) 
and Manchester (9–10 September 2014).
The authors would like to thank the following for their active participation in meetings: Damien 
Grimshaw and Anthony Rafferty (University of Manchester), Dominque Anxo (Centre for European 
Labour Studies), Emily Murphy (University of Lausanne), Terry Ward (Applica, Brussels), Robert 
Stehrer (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies), Janine Berg and Sangheon Lee 
(International Labour Office), Robert Strauss, Erik Meyermans and Laura de Dominicis (European 
Commission), Marton Csillag (Budapest Institute for Policy Analysis), Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo and 
José-Ignacio Antón (University of Salamanca) and Anne Saint-Martin (OECD).
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